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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study social influence and the dif-
fusion of information in decision making contexts with limited observable outcomes.
Chapter 1 studies social interactions and female genital mutilation (FGM), a tradi-
tional procedure of removing the whole or part of the female genitalia for non-medical
reasons. Using survey data from Egypt, this paper attempts to identify effects of peer
adoption and medicalization on a household’s decision to opt for FGM. We find that
households are less likely to adopt if their peers adopt less and (in certain areas) if
medicalization is more widely used by their peers.
Chapter 2, using a lab experiment, studies how influence of any given agent in a
social network is driven by assessments of their reliability by network members based on
observations of their past behavior. Agents repeatedly make choices, the optimality of
which depends on an unobserved state of the world; they are able to communicate those
choices with their social peers; and earn a reward after the last period. We enrich the
non-Bayesian DeGroot model by postulating that the extent to which network members
are influenced by a peer member depends on the extent of nonconformity, variability
and extremeness of their past choices. We find that inferred reliability has an effect as
significant as network centrality on social influence; when weighting the views of their
peers, individuals are sensitive to their observed behavior, especially for those peers
with low centrality.
vi
Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of a large-scale randomized intervention which pro-
vided incentivized block grants with the aim of improving twelve health and education
outcomes. Communities were incentivized by having grants sizes dependent on per-
formance. Our goal is to refine an earlier intention-to-treat evaluation, by examining
the intervention’s heterogeneous effect on the different subpopulations of households
defined by their participation in health information outreach. We find that incentivized
grants have a strong effect on immunization rates of children from households partici-
pating in outreach activities: as high as a 14.3% increase for children aged six months
or less, compared to a maximum average treatment effect of 3.7%.
vii
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Social Interactions on Female
Genital Mutilation: Evidence from Egypt
1.1 Introduction
An important determinant of human behavior is social interaction: individuals and
households are often influenced in their decisions by their neighborhood and peer’s
characteristics, or their peer’s decisions. Different motivations could be driving this,
such as learning, whereby agents use the experience of others to guide their choices;
imitation, possibly in response to social pressure or the need to conform; or coordina-
tion, such as the adoption of a technology that is only useful when widely adopted.
Therefore, any examination of economic and social behavior that fails to identify such
peer effects would be incomplete. This is especially true if we are interested in properly
assessing the effects of an intervention or policy, whether economic, social, or health
related. In the economics literature this phenomena has been studied in various ar-
eas such as education, crime, and health. Similarly, in this paper, we are interested
in how social interactions influence the adoption of a traditional practice with severe
repercussions on the welfare of female children, female genital mutilation.
Female genital mutilation (FGM)1 is the removal of the whole or part of the external
female genitalia of girls, from infancy to 15 years of age, for non-medical reasons. It
is mostly done as a rite of passage into female adulthood, an act of ‘cleansing’ in
1This is sometimes referred to with the less severe terms of “circumcision” and “cutting”. We use
these terms synonymously.
1
2preparation for marriage, and/or a method of curbing sexuality to ensure virginal
purity before marriage and fidelity after (WHO 2010). It is prevalent to different
degrees in Africa; its prevalence could be as high as 91% for women between the ages
of 15 and 49, in countries like Egypt (WHO 2012; El-Zanaty et al. 2009). World-wide,
between 100 to 140 million girls are estimated to have undergone this procedure (WHO
2010). It has been found to cause a variety of health problems if carried out in an non-
sanitary environment (by traditional circumcisers, for example), as well as long term
problems and complications in childbirth Mackie (2003). No health benefits have been
found. Additionally, it has been internationally recognized as a violation of the human
rights of girls who are forced to undergo this procedure (WHO 2010). It has been
compared to foot-binding in being a harmful traditional practice, ethically indefensible
due to its permanent physical and psychological damage (Mackie 1996). The World
Health Organization (WHO) has directed its advocacy and research efforts towards the
elimination of this practice, in conjunction with local governments (WHO 2010).
Typically, the procedure of FGM is done by a traditional circumciser2, but increas-
ingly professional health providers, such as doctors or nurses, are also doing it. This is
referred to as the medicalization of FGM, which has become a major concern for the
WHO and many anti-FGM activists. The WHO declared that under no circumstances
should health professionals preform FGM, regarding it as violation of the medical ethic
of “Do no harm”. There are also fears that medicalization might legitimize the prac-
tice, giving it the appearance of being beneficial, and hence rolling back the gains
made in the elimination of FGM (OHCHR et al. 2008). A more amendable position
views medicalization as a harm reducing temporary solution in societies where a sud-
den elimination of FGM is unlikely to take place. Such a view regards the resistance
to medicalization as counterproductive and harmful to the young girls who would then
have to suffer the painful procedure without anesthetics and proper sanitation and care
(B. Shell-Duncan 2001).
2In Egypt, mostly midwives (daya) and barbers
3Our goal is to study how households are influenced by their peers’ FGM adoption de-
cision when making their own FGM adoption decision, using Demographic and Health
Survey data from Egypt, a country where over 90% of women in rural areas live with
FGM. We want to see if a household’s probability of choosing FGM for their daughters
was affected by its neighbors’ decision, controlling for contextual effects—being in the
same environment—and exogenous social effects—being influenced by the demographic
characteristics of their neighbors as opposed to their behavior. More importantly, we
are interested in how, in Egypt, the increasing confluence of decisions with respect to
tradition and health, as observed in the increasing trend for medicalization (see Fig-
ure 1.2), has impacted FGM. More precisely, we want to test the hypotheses that a
household’s (a) neighbors’ FGM decision (FGM social effect) and (b) neighbors’ FGM
medicalization decision (medicalization social effect), conditional on opting for FGM,
have a significant effect on the household’s FGM decision. While the former effect is
useful in learning to what extent there is a social multiplier effect in the adoption of
FGM, the latter is of greater importance since government policy has mainly focused
on fighting medicalization to eliminate FGM. The FGM social effect could almost be
predicted simply based on intuition, but the medicalization social effect in unclear, and
hence it is critical to study in order to assess the consequences of policy. Unsurpris-
ingly, we do find that FGM social effect is strong and positive, and, interestingly, the
medicalization social effect is negative in some areas.
Identification of peer effects, however, must deal with a number of challenges: si-
multaneity (the reflection problem), selection, and disentangling social and contextual
effects (Manski 1993; Moffitt 2001; Blume et al. 2010)—social effects could be split
into endogenous effects, the effect of peers’ behavior, and exogenous effects, the effect
of peers’ characteristics. Previous work in the peer effects literature has had to either
assume that some of the social/contextual effects and/or the contextual effects are
not present; rely on exogenous variation in neighborhoods; or rely on an instrumental
4variable strategy. The identification strategy we use in this paper relies on geographic
location of households (as will be shown later, we define peer ‘neighborhoods’ on geo-
graphic proximity) to generate instrumental variables; we adapt to our data a method
proposed by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) to identify peer effects in social networks. In ad-
dition, since for each household we observe decisions made for each daughter, we use
fixed effects in our estimation.
This paper was inspired by Chesnokova et al. (2010) work on the persistence of
FGM as an equilibrium in society, using DHS data from Burkina Faso. They find that
as long there exist some circumcised women and circumcision is viewed as a desirable
quality by men, there will always be an incentive to have FGM done to girls to improve
marriageability3. While, from our results, we cannot draw any conclusions about the
effect of the marriage market on FGM, we will discuss below some possible links that
might explain what we observe.
FGM is a form of domestic violence: physical harm is brought to a vulnerable
population because they are female children. Since society cannot solely depend on
economic development to bring an end to this practice, policy must be relied on (Duflo
2011) (we do observe a reduction in FGM with richer, better educated households, but
we cannot make an causal conclusions about this). The problem in Egypt is that the
enforcement policy used to fight FGM is threatening a phenomena that could accelerate
its elimination.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2.5 the data used to produce our
results is described, in section 1.3 our empirical strategy is presented, our results are
presented in section 3.4 and discussed in section 1.5, and finally we conclude with
section 3.5.
3A finding that Bettina Shell-Duncan et al. (2011) find weak evidence for in Senegambia.
51.2 Data
In this paper we utilize the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey data for the year
2008 (EDHS 2008). This is the ninth such survey in Egypt, conducted every two or
three years since 1988. The survey focuses on a wide set of population, health, fertility,
and nutrition indicators. In 2008, 16,527 ever-married women of ages between 15 and
49 were interviewed, as well as a subsample of 5,430 men of ages between 15 to 59
who are residing in one in four of the womens’ households. Relevant to this paper,
the survey also collected data on FGM status for the interviewed women and their
daughters, by whom the procedure was done, at what age was it done, intentions to
circumcise uncircumcised daughters, exposure to information on FGM, and attitudes
towards FGM (El-Zanaty et al. 2009). The DHS survey design is standardized across
countries and surveys data is made available in a standard recode. The survey aims
for national population and geographic coverage, representing the entire population
across all domains, relying on random probability sampling. For EDHS 2008, surveyed
households were clustered into 1,241 clusters with an average of 14.3 households per
cluster (with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 45). Observations were gathered from
all the 27 governorates of Egypt in 2008 (Demographic and Health Survey Phase III
Sampling Manual 1996). Actual field work was conducted between 15 March 2008 and
late May 2008.
The primary data survey used in this paper is that of the unmarried daughters
residing in the household. Each eligible woman was asked about the FGM status of her
daughters and other related information. In our data, each observation corresponds
to a daughter of a surveyed woman, and for each we have their FGM characteristics
and their household’s characteristics: the parent’s education levels, occupation, wealth
level, etc. In addition, for each cluster, we have GPS coordinates, which we use in our
spatial analysis to infer social effects. The full survey produced 17,991 observations
from 9,963 households. However, since the majority of girls are circumcised around the
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Figure 1.1: FGM Density Plots By Cohort
age of puberty, only those born before 1996 are considered (ages 12 and above). The
upper plot in Figure 1.1 shows the density distribution of the daughter’s sample. The
vertical line shows the cut off age for our sample in order not to bias our estimates with
younger girls who have not yet reached the age at which they are risk of FGM. Using
the entire sample, we find that only 5% of girls would undergo the FGM procedure
after they have reached the age of 12. The subsample that we use for our analysis is
composed of 6,563 observations in 4,619 households.
Table 1.1 gives descriptive statistics for the considered sample, stratified by wealth
level, urban/rural residence, and religion. We see a greater tendency for FGM among
the poorer, rural and Muslim households. Also noticeable is a greater tendency for
medicalization for richer, urban, and Muslim households. In Figure 1.2, we notice a
decrease over cohorts in the rate of overall circumcision with increase in the rate of
medicalization.
7Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
All Circumcised Medicalizationa N
All 100% 67.74% 71.88% 6253
By Wealth Index (Poorest) 26.48% 76.57% 58.83% 1656
By Wealth Index (Poorer) 22.07% 78.70% 70.99% 1380
By Wealth Index (Middle) 19.32% 72.68% 73.35% 1208
By Wealth Index (Richer) 16.10% 59.68% 88.35% 1007
By Wealth Index (Richest) 16.02% 40.22% 87.59% 1002
By Education (None) 48.58% 75.61% 64.91% 3038
By Education (Primary) 16.33% 76.30% 73.81% 1021
By Education (Secondary) 29.46% 57.17% 83.67% 1842
By Education (Higher) 5.63% 30.40% 91.59% 352
Rural Residence 62.40% 76.68% 69.35% 3902
Urban Residence 37.60% 52.91% 77.97% 2351
By Religion (Christian) 4.77% 42.62% 29.87% 298
By Religion (Muslim) 95.30% 69.02% 71.92% 5959
a Conditional on circumcision
8l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Cohort
FG
M
l l
l l
l
l
l l l
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Cohort
M
ed
ica
liz
at
io
n
Figure 1.2: FGM Trends: points on the plot indicate the proportion of households of
a particular cohort opting for FGM or medicalization, respectively. The vertical lines
represent the 95% confidence interval.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 The Model
The linear-in-means model that we are interested in estimating is
yihr = β · xi + δ ·
∑
j∈Pi
xj
ni
+ γ
∑
j∈Pi
yj
ni
+ ηh + ρr + εihr (1.1)
and where E[εihr|x(1,h), . . . ,x(Rh,h), ηh, ρ1, . . . , ρRh ] = 0.
The subscript i = {1, . . . , N} identifies daughters (the observations of interest),
h = {1, . . . ,M} their household, and r = {1, . . . , Rh} their order of birth within their
household, where Rh is the number of daughters in household h. The variable yihr is a
indicator of whether a particular daughter has undergone FGM. Each daughter i has
a peer group whose characteristics and behavior might influence i’s household’s FGM
decision. In this specification, we model it as the set observations Pi (ni = |Pi| is the
number of i’s neighbors). The dependent variable is regressed on
9• The K × 1 vector xi of a daughter’s individual characteristics, composed of
daughter-specific regressors and household-invariant regressors
• The mean of x of a daughter’s peer group Pi, and whose K × 1 vector of coeffi-
cients, δ, represents exogenous social effects
• The mean of y of a daughter’s peer group Pi, and whose coefficient, γ, represents
endogenous social effects
• The household fixed effect ηh
• The birth order fixed effect ρr
We transform this model to use matrix notation to facilitate the use of an interaction
matrix to represent peer groups (Bramoulle´ et al. 2009). We use the logical N × N
matrix W˜ to indicate whether any two daughters are considered peers (we will further
explain what defines peers for the purposes of this model below).
(W˜ij) = 1{i and j are peers}
We further normalize this matrix to the row stochastic W, where
(Wij) =
W˜ij
ni
Our model now becomes
y = Xβ + WXδ + Wyγ + η + ρ+ ε (1.2)
where y is N × 1 vector of FGM status, X is a N ×K matrix of daughters’ charac-
teristics, η is a N × 1 vector of {η1, . . . , ηM}, each repeated Rh times, and ρ is a N × 1
vector of {ρ1, . . . , ρRh}.
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1.3.1.1 Reference Group
In order to carry out our social effects analysis we need to define each daughter’s peer
group Pi or the interaction matrix W. First we define the logical matrices
A˜ : (A˜ij) = 1{distij ≤ 10 kilometers4}
C˜ : (C˜ij) = 1{|agei − agej | ≤ 1 year}
H˜ : (C˜ij) = 1{householdi = householdj}
from which we define the interaction matrix, excluding all same household daughters
from the peer group, since we are ultimately interested in estimating the influence of
peers on a household’s decision making.
W˜ = A˜ ◦ C˜ ◦ ¬H˜
This means we define the peer group that would influence a household’s FGM
decision for daughter i as all daughters i) not in the same household, ii) who are
within a ten kilometer radius, iii) and whose absolute age difference does not exceed
one year.
While we do model the peer groups or ‘neighborhoods’ as a network (as is commonly
done in the social networks literature), we do not mean to model explicit social links
between households or daughters. A daughter’s peer group is used to estimate what
is common practice in the area of residence5. In other words, we decide to consider
4Any smaller range would be problematic according to the DHS because of location displacement,
whereby GPS coordinates are randomly altered in order to preserve survey subjects’ privacy. This is
also the reason we do not rely on the distance between clusters to weigh our interaction matrix (DHS
2012).
5Inference based on such estimated averages is further discussed below.
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Figure 1.3: For node 1, nodes 2-4 are considered direct neighbors, while nodes 5-9 are
indirect neighbors.
two daughters as network neighbors if all the conditions outlined above are true. It
might be more intuitive to understand how this is modeled by viewing the space of
observations as divided into planes, with each plane representing a cohort group, and
on each plane, observations of that cohort group are placed according to their GPS
coordinates. On each plane we then have overlapping circles, each centered on an
observation (or more accurately, its cluster), and any observation within such a circle
is considered a neighbor, which we represent by a network link. Figure 1.3 shows an
example of such a network.
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1.3.1.2 Identification
So far, this is a typical linear-in-means model with all the identification challenges
this entails: simultaneity (the reflection problem), endogeneity, and correlated effects
(Manski 1993; Moffitt 2001; Blume et al. 2010; Bramoulle´ et al. 2009). The reduced
form of this model would be
y = (I−Wγ)−1Xβ+ (I−Wγ)−1WXδ+ (I−Wγ)−1η+ (I−Wγ)−1ρ+ (I−Wγ)−1ε
(1.3)
It is clear from equation (1.3) that we cannot separately identify exogenous and en-
dogenous social effects (the parameters δ and γ). We therefore follow the identification
strategy described by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009). First they show that by substituting in
equation (1.3) the expansion (I −Wγ)−1 = ∑∞k=0 γkWk, premultiplying by W, and
taking expectation we get
E[Wy|X, η, ρ] = (
∞∑
k=0
γkWk+1)Xβ + (
∞∑
k=0
γkWk+2)Xδ + (
∞∑
k=0
γkWk+1)(η + ρ) (1.4)
According to Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), if the matrices I, W, and W2 are linearly
independent the social effects are separately identified. Note that Wk provides an
interaction matrix for all neighbors at a distance of k, where two nodes are said to
be of k distance from each other if there exists a path between them passing through
k other nodes. The concept of ‘distance’ here is based on network links, not spatial
distance. What this entails is the existence of intransitive triads in the social network:
daughters that have a common peer but are not each other’s peers (see Figure 1.3).
This allows us to use (W2X,W3X, . . . ) as instrumental variables for Wy in equation
(1.2). As shown in equation (1.4) these variables influence E[Wy|X, η, ρ] without
having a direct effect on y. In other words, we can use the exogenous social effects of a
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daughter’s peers’ peers (their exogenous characteristics) as instruments for endogenous
social effects (the peer households’ endogenous FGM decision), as long as there exists
intransitive triads.
Another identification problem in linear-in-means models is correlated effects: un-
observable neighborhood/regional effects that would influence FGM decision making
and are correlated with observed daughter and household characteristics. Bramoulle´
et al. (2009) address this problem by introducing either global network fixed effects, a
fixed effect for each component in the network, or local network fixed effects, a fixed
effect for each individual’s direct neighbors. They then use within differencing to elimi-
nate these fixed effects in their estimation. In this analysis, we introduce a similar fixed
effect to capture household hetergeneity. Since we observe possibly multiple daughters
from the same household we rely on a similar within transformation. Bramoulle´ et al.
(2009) show that identification in this case requires the stronger condition of having I,
W, W2, and W3.
Yet another identification challenge in linear-in-means models is peer group endo-
geneity: unobservable characteristics that influence FGM decision making and cause
households to choose to associate with other households that make similar decisions
(Moffitt 2001). We find it improbable that household are going to be driven to select
their location of residence based on the FGM decisions of their neighbors. Nonetheless,
we attempt to forestall any possible problems by eliminating from our analysis any
households that have not resided in their current location for at least ten years.
1.3.1.3 Medicalization
So far, our model has not deviated much from Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), but since we are
mainly interested in the effect of medicalization on a household’s decision we modify
our model to be
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y = Xβ + WXδ + Wyγ + Wmλ+ η + ρ+ ε (1.5)
where m is a N × 1 vector of binary variables indicating whether a household,
conditional on having opted for FGM, decided to rely on a medical practitioner rather
than a traditional circumciser. Hence, Wm results in the N × 1 vector of mean med-
icalization of a daughter’s peer group. While Wm is unlikely to suffer from the same
simultaneity problems of Wy, since, having opted for FGM, a household is unlikely to
be influenced peer’s FGM decision, Wy, in choosing miht, we nevertheless rely on the
same instrumental variable approach used to identify Wy.
1.3.1.4 Generated Regressors
One problem in linear-in-means models, raised by Manski (1993), is the use of sample
peer means as if they are the actual unobserved social influence regressor of interest,
effectively neglecting the fact that such sample means are estimates from a first stage
estimation. This could cause problems for inference. In Wooldridge (2010) such re-
gressors are referred to as generated regressors, which are shown to be consistent but
the standard errors produced by OLS would be incorrect. In our case, another advan-
tage of using instrumental variables for identification is that heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are sufficient in testing the significance of our estimates.
1.3.1.5 Proxies for Modernization
One remaining concern is that our estimation might suffer from omitted variable bias
because of possible unobservable influence of ‘modernization’ in medical care on the
FGM decision: as different areas become more modernized they would perhaps become
less likely to opt for a traditional practice such as FGM, and should they decide to have
it done they would seek a medical practitioner rather than a traditional daya—it would
be correlated with the Wm. In order to control for this unobservable modernization
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effect, we use some proxy variables related to the child delivery choices of neighbors,
such as (a) the fraction of households in the peer group that decided to have their
child delivered by a daya as opposed to a medical practitioner, (b) and the location
of delivery. We calculate these averages for births during the same period the FGM
decision is made6. Recall that FGM decision is normally done around the age of twelve,
so we are seeing different groups who are making FGM and child delivery decisions. In
other words, focusing one such proxy, dayaihr, we make the following assumptions
E(yihr|zihr,modernihr, dayaihr) = E(yiht|zihr,modernihr)
L(modernihr|1, zihr, dayaihr) = L(modernihr|1, dayaihr)
where zihr are all other regressors and modernihr is unobserved modernization.
1.3.2 Implementation
1.3.2.1 Variables
Of the household characteristics we are interested in we use:
• Wealth level: ‘poor’ or ‘rich’, with ‘poor’ as the omitted level7
• Urban or rural residence, with rural residence as the omitted level
• The mother’s marital age
• The mother’s FGM status
• Religion: Christian or Muslim, with Muslim as the omitted level
• The sex of the head of household, with male as the omitted level
6Data is only available for child births preceding the time of survey by six years.
7The DHS wealth index is used here, which is divided into quintiles: poorest, poorer, middle,
richer, richest. Calculations of household wealth are based on standard of living measures derived from
the survey questionnaires, based on such indicators as the ownership of assets, the characteristics of
housing, and the source of drinking water. In this paper, the wealth levels are reduced to two groups:
the poorest/poorer/middle are reclassified as poor, and the rest as rich.
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• Whether seeking medical help is ‘not a problem’ or a ‘big problem’ due to distance
or cost, with ‘not a problem’ as the omitted level
• Highest level of mother’s education: no education, primary education, secondary
education, or higher education, with no education as the omitted level
1.3.2.2 Instrumental Variables
The first step in identifying possible instrumental variables for Wy from W2X we run
the first stage regression
Wy = θ1 + W
2Xφ1 + ν1
and, similarly to instrument Wm
Wm = θ2 + W
2Xφ2 + ν2.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the results of these regressions . The first columns shows
the regression using all of W2X, while the second columns show the regression using
the instrumental variables selected for our analysis. Using a heteroskedastic overiden-
tification test, using three instruments for the two endogenous regressors in equation
(1.5), we fail to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid (p-value = 0.8658)
(Wooldridge 2010).
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Direct Effects
The first regression results presented are those for direct effects of individual charac-
teristics on the likelihood of FGM only (shown in Table 1.4); we want to examine how
particular observable characteristics of households influence the FGM decision for their
daughters. The first column shows the results using an OLS regression while the second
is shown for a household fixed effects (FE) regression.
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Table 1.2: FGM Endogenous Social Effect First
Stage Regression
Estimate
(Standard Error)
(1) (2)
Wealth (Poorer) 0.051
(0.053)
Wealth (Middle) 0.012
(0.065)
Wealth (Richer) 0.080
(0.072)
Wealth (Richest) -0.159** -0.218***
(0.073) (0.050)
Residence (Urban) 0.078*
(0.042)
Education (Primary) 0.026
(0.046)
Education (Secondary) -0.100*
(0.059)
Education (Higher) 0.577*** 0.733***
(0.132) (0.118)
Marital Age 0.004
(0.005)
Mother FGM 0.305*** 0.356***
(0.091) (0.084)
Religion (Christian) -0.319***
(0.119)
HH Head Sex (Female) 0.141**
(0.068)
Medical Help Dist. (Big Problem) -0.036
(0.049)
Discussed FGM -0.001
(0.040)
Received Info on FGM -0.012
(0.055)
F-test on instruments 6.214 17.664
N 6206 6206
R2 0.760 0.757
Adjusted R2 0.757 0.754
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘·’ is 10 percent, ‘*’ is
5 percent, ‘**’ is 1 percent, and ‘***’ is 0.1 percent.
18
Table 1.3: Medicalization Endogenous Social Ef-
fect First Stage Regression
Estimate
(Standard Error)
(1) (2)
Wealth (Poorer) 0.107
(0.066)
Wealth (Middle) 0.022
(0.073)
Wealth (Richer) 0.161*
(0.091)
Wealth (Richest) -0.154
(0.102)
Residence (Urban) -0.049
(0.059)
Education (Primary) 0.037
(0.075)
Education (Secondary) -0.089
(0.073)
Education (Higher) 0.269*
(0.150)
Marital Age 0.014**
(0.006)
Mother FGM 0.128
(0.085)
Religion (Christian) -0.429*** -0.446***
(0.107) (0.105)
HH Head Sex (Female) 0.128
(0.101)
Medical Help Dist. (Big Problem) 0.033
(0.063)
Discussed FGM 0.038
(0.051)
Received Info on FGM -0.103***
(0.033)
F-test on instruments 4.863 17.928
N 6206 6206
R2 0.615 0.607
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.602
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘·’ is 10 percent, ‘*’ is
5 percent, ‘**’ is 1 percent, and ‘***’ is 0.1 percent.
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The first thing to observe is the apparent increased likelihood of FGM, in the FE
results, for daughters of the fifth or sixth birth order. We also notice, in both esti-
mations, a significant negative likelihood of FGM for younger cohorts, suggesting a
decreasing FGM trend across the country over time. In the OLS regression, we see
some expected results: a significant negative likelihood of FGM for wealthier house-
holds, households that reside in urban areas, households where mothers got married
at an older age, households that discussed FGM with their neighbors, and households
where mothers have higher levels of education; and a significant positive likelihood for
households with more daughters. A significant negative likelihood is also found for
Christian households (compared to Muslim households), which is somewhat surprising
considering that FGM is a practice that predates Islam in Egypt.
1.4.2 Social Effects
In this section, we present the results for the main linear-in-means regressions, used
to identify the social effects of FGM and its medicalization, on the household FGM
decision—how households are influenced by other households’ FGM and medicalization
decisions. In Table 1.5, we first consider regression results when we do not use household
fixed effects, and in Table 1.6 we do.
In Table 1.5, we do not see any big change in direct effects compared to column
(1) in Table 1.4, whether as estimates or standard errors. In the first three columns,
we ran OLS regressions without any instrumental variables. In these columns, we
see that the peer group mean of FGM decision has a positive and significant value.
In columns (2) and (3), we add the group mean for medicalization which is positive
but insignificant. The interaction between FGM and medicalization group means is
negative and similarly insignificant. In column (4), we try the same regression as in
(1) but with instrumental variables for the FGM peer group mean, and we find that
it has a strong positive effect. In column (5), we test for nonlinearity by adding a
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Table 1.4: Direct Effects Only
Estimate
(Standard Error)
(1) (2)
OLS FE
Birth Order
2 0.014 -0.001
(0.012) (0.018)
3 -0.007 -0.039
(0.027) (0.036)
4 -0.122** -0.067
(0.060) (0.070)
5 0.114 0.151**
(0.104) (0.060)
6 0.076 0.229***
(0.051) (0.060)
Wealth
Poorer 0.005
(0.015)
Middle -0.010
(0.017)
Richer -0.060**
(0.023)
Richest -0.131***
(0.029)
Cohort
1989 -0.012 -0.009
(0.021) (0.025)
1990 -0.004 0.009
(0.020) (0.024)
1991 -0.044** -0.040
(0.020) (0.029)
1992 -0.063*** -0.038
(0.021) (0.032)
1993 -0.072*** -0.072**
(0.022) (0.036)
1994 -0.150*** -0.120***
(0.024) (0.040)
1995 -0.209*** -0.206***
(0.025) (0.046)
1996 -0.373*** -0.319***
(0.024) (0.051)
Residence (Urban) -0.068***
(0.017)
Marital Age -0.005***
(0.002)
Mother FGM 0.336***
(0.029)
Religion (Christian) -0.270***
(0.032)
HH Head Sex (Female) -0.022
(0.018)
Medical Help Dist. (Big Problem) -0.005
(0.014)
Medical Help Cost (Big Problem) -0.012
(0.013)
Discussed FGM -0.031**
(0.013)
Received Info on FGM 0.006
(0.014)
Number of Daughters 0.031***
(0.008)
Education Level
Primary 0.014
(0.015)
Secondary -0.064***
(0.017)
Higher -0.177***
(0.035)
N 6206 6253
R2 0.359 0.191
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.056
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘·’ is 10 percent, ‘*’ is
5 percent, ‘**’ is 1 percent, and ‘***’ is 0.1 percent.
b In the OLS regression, fixed effects for governorates were also
used.
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quadratic term, but then all effects become insignificant. In columns (6) and (8), we
add the peer group mean medicalization, and in the latter we use an instrumental
variable. Medicalization is found to have a negative effect, but is only significant in
the former specification (not IV). Peer group means of FGM continue to be positive
(with a higher magnitude) and significant. In columns (7) and (9), we add quadratic
terms for peer group means for both FGM and its medicalization. Again in these
specification all effects become insignificant. Finally, in column (10), we interact the
peer group mean regressors. FGM peer group means are found to be positive and
significant, while medicalization peer group means continue to be insignificant. From
this table we suspect that the hypothesis that the peer group mean of FGM has a strong
positive effect on a household’s FGM decision is probably true, but we are unable to
make any clear conclusions about medicalization. However, as stated above, because of
the problem with correlated effects and the possible endogeneity due to unobservable
household effects that are correlated with our regressors, we need to leverage the within
information we have about households.
In Table 1.6, we introduce household fixed effects to address some of these prob-
lems, coupled with the existing instrumental variable strategy. In columns (1) and (2),
we regress only on the peer group means of FGM and we continue to find a significant
positive effect, with some convexity on introducing a quadratic term. In columns (3)
and (4), we introduce medicalization, and in the latter specification we use instrumental
variables. We now observe a significant negative effect (almost halved in the latter spec-
ification). The effect of peer group FGM means continues to be significantly positive
and increases in magnitude. In columns (5) and (6), we introduced some nonlinearity.
In column (5), there is still a positive and negative effect to peer group means of FGM
and medicalization, respectively—with some concavity and convexity, respectively. In
column (6), the significance and direction of effect is unchanged, but the magnitudes
are diminished (in this specification we see the highest level of R2 in this table). There
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does appear to be a reduced negative effect of medicalization as FGM peer group means
increase, but is only significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.5: FGM Endogenous Effects Regression (Pooled)
Estimate
(Standard Error)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
fgmjt 0.528*** 0.511*** 0.528*** 1.031*** 0.526 1.490*** -0.511 1.609*** 0.074 1.302***
(0.040) (0.047) (0.050) (0.234) (0.483) (0.379) (0.752) (0.465) (0.806) (0.335)
(fgmjt)
2 0.488 1.540** 0.919
(0.406) (0.640) (0.678)
medjt 0.023 0.122 -0.529** 0.312 -0.684 0.356 0.519
(0.036) (0.103) (0.218) (0.434) (0.515) (0.990) (0.898)
(medjt)
2 -0.726** -0.502
(0.370) (0.851)
fgmjt ×medjt -0.111 -0.735
(0.103) (0.997)
N 6206 6206 6206 6206 6206 6206 6206 6206 6206 6206
R2 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.366 0.356 0.339 0.329 0.326 0.354 0.355
Adjusted R2 0.381 0.381 0.381 0.358 0.348 0.331 0.321 0.317 0.345 0.347
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘·’ is 10 percent, ‘*’ is 5 percent, ‘**’ is 1 percent, and ‘***’ is 0.1 percent.
b Other regressors not shown: residence, mother’s marital age, mother’s FGM status, religion, whether the head of household is
female, difficulty in accessing medical help due to distance or cost, whether there is discussion of FGM with peers, whether
household received information on FGM, governorate fixed effects, cohort (year of birth) fixed effects, order of birth fixed effects,
number of daughters, ‘modernization’ proxy variables, and peer group means of exogenous household characteristics (exogenous
social effects).
c Only 8-10 use instruments for both fgm and med. Other columns use instruments only for fgm.
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Table 1.6: FGM Endogenous Effects Regression (Household Fixed Effects)
Estimate
(Standard Error)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS + FE 2SLS + FE 2SLS + FE 2SLS + FE 2SLS + FE 2SLS + FE 2SLS + FE 2SLS + FE
fgmjt 1.220*** -0.887*** 1.397*** 1.316*** 2.111*** 0.765*** 1.716*** 1.762***
(0.082) (0.183) (0.096) (0.094) (0.280) (0.087) (0.115) (0.114)
(fgmjt)
2 1.366*** -1.411***
(0.144) (0.211)
medjt -0.646*** -0.132** -3.367*** -0.270 0.023 -0.486***
(0.074) (0.066) (0.313) (0.170) (0.099) (0.113)
(medjt)
2 3.082***
(0.265)
fgmjt ×medjt 0.364**
(0.161)
medjt× Urban -0.529*** -0.487***
(0.162) (0.180)
medjt× Medical Help Distance -0.469***
(0.138)
medjt× Urban × Medical Help Distance 2.035***
(0.470)
medjt× Medical Help Cost 0.224*
(0.131)
medjt× Urban × Medical Help Cost 1.578***
(0.322)
N 6229 6229 6229 6229 6229 6229 6229 6229
R2 0.182 0.174 0.193 0.184 0.095 0.203 0.143 0.150
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.050 0.056 0.053 0.027 0.059 0.041 0.043
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘·’ is 10 percent, ‘*’ is 5 percent, ‘**’ is 1 percent, and ‘***’ is 0.1 percent.
b Other regressors not shown: governorate fixed effects, cohort (year of birth) fixed effects, order of birth fixed effects, ‘modernization’ proxy variables, and peer
group means of exogenous household characteristics (exogenous social effects).
c Columns 1-4 use instruments for fgm only, while the remaining use instruments for both fgm and med.
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Having established that there is a negative effect to medicalization, we introduce
some interaction terms in the last two columns of Table 1.6 to further investigate
how the effect might vary in different contexts, namely, urban versus rural, and with
different levels of difficulty accessing medical help (either because of distance or cost).
With three levels of interactions, it is easier to analyze our results by using Table
1.7. We see that in rural areas medicalization has a negative effect, does not seem
to be affected by difficulty in accessing medical help due to distance, and does seem
to have a weaker negative effect if the household has difficulty accessing medical help
due to cost. In urban areas, the effect of medicalization is more nuanced; it appears
to be negative for households with no problem accessing medical help (for either of
the reasons considered), but has significant positive effect if they do have problems
accessing medical help.
1.5 Discussion
Yet another view sees medicalization as helpful in eroding the traditional practice, as
FGM is moved from the traditional community-level domain and marriage market to
the domain of modern medicine. It would no longer be a moral issue, but a health issue,
and hence would meet with weaker resistance to attempts to completely eliminate it on
health grounds. Another contributing factor to this possible story is the unobservable
nature of FGM before and after marriage, and hence the possible reliance on traditional
circumcisers as certifiers of ‘quality’. Thus, as FGM is increasingly done in government
clinics by professional health providers, who are less connected to the marriage market
in local communities, it loses its effectiveness as a signal of ‘quality’.
The practice of FGM can be viewed as an innovation that has gained wide accep-
tance and adoption in society, and the move to medicalization can be viewed as a form
of re-invention of this practice. What is interesting about the changes we observe is
that this form of re-invention is undermining the overall practice, slowly leading to its
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Table 1.7: Urban/Rural and Medical Help Interactions
Estimate
(p-value)
Rural Urban
Medical Help Distance (No Problem) 0.023 -0.506***
(0.815) (0.001)
Medical Help Distance (Problem) -0.446*** 1.061**
(0.000) (0.015)
Difference 0.469*** -1.567***
(0.001) (0.000)
Medical Help Cost (No Problem) -0.486*** -0.973***
(0.000) (0.000)
Medical Help Cost (Problem) -0.262*** 0.829***
(0.006) (0.002)
Difference -0.224* -1.803***
(0.086) (0.000)
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘·’ is 10 percent, ‘*’ is
5 percent, ‘**’ is 1 percent, and ‘***’ is 0.1 percent.
discontinuance. What appears to be the modernization of an entrenched practice that
is resistant to policy, actually weakens it by changing its characteristics significantly—
moving it from the marriage market to the health domain (Rogers 2003). What makes
FGM difficult to eliminate is that, while it is a form of physical violence against fe-
male children, it is not regarded as such by its practitioners. In fact, parents would
be viewed as negligent were they not to have this procedure done. Medicalization can
then be viewed as taking away this perceived benefit, whether by removing its benefit
as a signal of quality in the marriage market, or by changing the method of benefit
evaluation—it is evaluated by its health benefit as opposed to its social benefit.
1.6 Conclusion
As has been shown by our results, there is a strong social component, in Egypt, to
households’ decision to circumcise their daughters. Households tended to follow the
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same behavior as other members of their community. However, in terms of medicaliza-
tion, there appears to be a negative social effect (for most households with no problems
accessing medical help). Households were less likely to choose FGM for their daughters
the more prevalent is medicalization in their peer group. This appears to strengthens
the harm reduction argument of those who call for tolerating medicalization in the in-
terest of providing a less painful and sanitary procedure for those who opt for FGM (B.
Shell-Duncan 2001). These results are also a call on policy makers who are seeking to
eliminate FGM, to consider the possible unintended consequences of focusing on elim-
inating medicalization in government clinics. Our results point to directly influencing
households’ FGM decision as a possibly more fruitful policy, since we see a strong mul-
tiplier effect, since households have a very strong endogenous influence on each other.
This could be done by increasing awareness in communities of the harmful nature of
this practice as was carried out in Senegal (Diop et al. 2009), while not pushing them
away from medical clinics back into the domain of traditional circumcisers, where they
might be less accessible to outreach campaigns.
One proposed story explaining these findings, is related to the pernicious nature
of the marriage market social network in which dayas might play the role of ‘quality
certifiers’. Due to the unobservable and unverifiable nature of FGM, reputation plays
a critical role here. As the FGM procedure moves away from the traditional sphere
into that of professional healthcare its links to the marriage market is weakened, as
healthcare providers are less likely to play a role in the marriage market. We might
also be observing a modernization scenario, in which the endogenous social effect of
medicalization is a proxy for a move away from traditional practices across all house-
holds in a particular area, irrespective of the other observed household characteristics.
As mentioned, we attempt to address this problem by the use of data on child delivery
choices contemporary to the FGM decision.
However, we must be cautious in making any recommendations calling for a rollback
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in the elimination for FGM in medical facilities. There is always the danger that such a
reversal of policy might give the impression of greater legitimacy, and households that
were previously indecisive about FGM would regard such a move as approving of the
procedure. In fact, some of our results should make us very cautious in dealing with the
problem of legitimization. We see a positive effect to medicalization in urban areas with
poor access to medical help (either due to distance or cost), which could plausibly be
the influence of observing increased medicalization in one’s peer group and perceiving
it as evidence of its benefit, and without easy access to medical practitioners (and their
mitigating influence) FGM is increasingly sought from traditional circumcisers8.
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Chapter 2
Learning From and About Your Peers:A Social
Learning Lab Experiment
2.1 Introduction
“The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to
information stored in memory, and the information provides the answer.
Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition.” (Simon 1992)
In most economic and social settings, individuals do not make choices in isolation,
but rely heavily on information available in their social network. In many of these set-
tings they are confronted with informational constraints such that they do not observe
the outcome of their own choices, or those of their peers, precluding them from making
corrections or experimenting. The information communicated between peers is thus
solely that of beliefs, not evidence. Therefore, in the absence of observed outcomes
that can be objectively evaluated, learning about optimal choices can take the guise of
social norms or conventions, which are vulnerable to bias and ideological traps. This
is analogous to how “beliefs and theories” evolve with respect to health behavior in
both poor countries with limited sources of information and rich countries where scien-
tific evidence is sometimes ignored (beliefs on the efficacy of vaccination being a good
example in both contexts) (A. V. Banerjee et al. 2011).
To highlight the role of observable outcomes, consider how differently the inno-
vations of surgical anesthesia and antiseptics diffused. The former, its effect being
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immediately experienced, became widely adopted in a short span of time, while the
latter, relying on unobservable germ theory, took much longer to gain acceptance in
the medical community. Similarly, interventions are needed to convince medical staff in
rural parts of India to adopt recommended childbirth practices. The welfare of mothers
and their newborns is not linked in an obvious way to these practices, thus the need to
socially influence nurses (Gawande 2013). Ultimately, the main question with this form
of diffusion of beliefs and ideas—social learning—is: how efficiently does a social net-
work aggregate all the private information of its members, to whom do individuals turn
as opinion leaders, and how robust is a network to misinformation if some of its mem-
bers persistently hold incorrect views? Or alternatively, to ask the inverse question:
how resistant would a social network be to newer—perhaps better—information?
As new information is introduced into a community, it percolates through the social
network, requiring individuals to balance their prior beliefs against new ones. Crucially,
they must evaluate the reliability of the social links through which they are receiving
this information. In the social learning literature, the study of how the beliefs of peers
are weighted has focused on the architecture of the social network: social influence is
determined by how central individuals are in the network. In this paper, we introduce
perceived reliability, based on individuals’ observed behavior, as an additional determi-
nant of social influence. In social learning models, individuals use their peers’ observed
choices as information about an unknown state of the world1. We postulate that the
manner in which these observed choices change over time is also used as information
about the reliability of those peers2.
The process of social learning is one of updating beliefs over time as more is learned
from—and, as we argue, about—one’s peers. There are two ways this process has
been modeled in the literature: Bayesian and non-Bayesian learning. Bayesian social
learning requires a sophisticated knowledge of how information flows through a net-
1For example, the binary possibilities of ‘vaccination is effective’ versus ‘vaccination is ineffective’.
2It is worth noting that reliability assessment in our model is different from how one agent might
interpret the behavior of another in a strategic setting (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2011).
31
work, enabling agents to update their beliefs in an optimal fashion. In non-Bayesian
social learning models, agents use a rule-of-thumb approach to processing information,
which might better approximate learning, because of the cognitive limitations of most
individuals, confronted with the complexity of making inferences in their social net-
works (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2011). Empirical evidence from a framed experiment
in the field also suggests that the non-Bayesian model of social learning might be more
representative of how real individuals learn (Chandrasekhar et al. 2011).
In this paper, we adopt an empirical non-Bayesian DeGroot model that we estimate
using data from a lab experiment. Individuals are assumed to update their beliefs using
a heuristic weighted averaging rule of their own and their peers’ prior beliefs (DeG-
root 1974; Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2011). Such a model has been used in most of the
theoretical literature on misinformation and excessive influence in social learning (De-
Marzo et al. 2003; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi 2010; Golub et al. 2010).
However, to our knowledge, this is the first study to hypothesize that agents develop
beliefs about the reliability of their peers based on their observed behavior and network
centrality, in addition to developing beliefs about the state of the world. Prior theoret-
ical and empirical works, such as the various experimental and observational studies on
social learning and diffusion (Anderson et al. 1997; S. Choi et al. 2005; Syngjoo Choi et
al. 2007; Chandrasekhar et al. 2011; Mo¨bius et al. 2010; A. Banerjee et al. 2011; Chris-
takis et al. 2012), have mainly focused on different aspects of the architecture of social
networks as the determinants of influence. Behavioral characteristics of agents have
been proposed as the cause of excessive influence and misinformation. Stubbornness,
the tendency to resist new information and to update beliefs slowly, was introduced in
the Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi (2010) model, but it was assumed that
agents would be oblivious to such a behavior. Our aim is to generalize such learning
models by allowing agents to be cognizant of their peers’ behavior patterns, and more
importantly to use an experiment to empirically assess the plausibility of such models.
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We carry out our inquiry into the perception of reliability contingent on three ob-
served behaviors. We refer to the first behavior as choice variability. It is a measure of
how dispersed an observed agent’s choices are over time. The lower range of variability
would capture stubbornness, while the higher range would capture fickleness or volatil-
ity. The second behavior studied is nonconformity, which is a measure of how different
a peer’s observed choices are from other sources of information. The third behavior
studied is choice extremity, which is the degree to which an agent is confident that one
of the possible states of the world is the correct one.
To test our hypothesis of perception of reliability, we conducted a series of lab ex-
periments. We recruited subjects using an online labor market—Amazon Mechanical
Turk—and had them participate interactively using a web application. Subjects were
placed in groups of eight that represented their social network. At the start of the
experiment, they were provided with independent and identically distributed private
signals that were correct with a probability of 2/3, and then they were asked to re-
peatedly make a choice indicating their belief on the true state of the world. Each
time, they were permitted to observe their network neighbors’ prior choices, and after
their participation in the experiment was completed, they were awarded the payoff they
earned based on the accuracy of their answers. During the experiment agents were not
provided with feedback on the accuracy of their choices, so they had to rely only on
their private signal and the observed choices of their peers. Since we are interested
in agents’ response to different choice pattern treatments and were not confident we
would observe them in the artificial experimental setting, we introduced automated
subjects, or automatons for short, that were programmed to behave in the manner
required3. Using the data from the experiment, we estimated our modified DeGroot
learning model in order to identify the partial effects of the behaviors of interest. We
did not aim to estimate social influence, the impact an agent has on asymptotic con-
3Human subjects were informed of the presence of such automatons, just not which experiments or
neighbors, hence avoiding deception.
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sensus beliefs, directly. Instead, we estimated the parameters that capture how the
DeGroot weighting rule is affected by observed behavior, which ultimately drives social
influence.
Our findings show that, controlling for network centrality, agents are indeed respon-
sive to their neighbors’ behavior and appear to base their perception of reliability on
them. Our regression results show that the three behavioral measures we proposed—
choice variability, nonconformity, and choice extremity—have a significant effect on
how much weight is allocated to a peer’s views. We found that low choice variability—
stubbornness—is interpreted as a sign of low reliability, while greater nonconformity
and choice extremity as signs of reliability.
We also found that this response to neighbors’ behavior changes depending on their
network centrality. For choice variability and nonconformity, agents appear to be less
responsive to their neighbors’ behavior as their neighbors’ centrality increases. In other
words, while agents are listened to more as their centrality increases, the effect of their
behavior patterns becomes less significant. With choice extremity, we see an opposite
effect: agents are more responsive to their high centrality neighbors. Additionally, as
time increases, we find a diminishing response to all the studied behaviors, network
centrality, and the behavior-centrality interactions.
We also investigated how accurate perceptions of reliability based on observed be-
havior are in comparison to true reliability: how close agents are to the true state of
the world at the end of an experiment. We found that nonconforming, low choice vari-
ability, or high choice extremity agents tend to be misinformed. With nonconformity
and variability, this effect on misinformation tends to increase as network centrality
increases. However, only with nonconformity did misinformation appear to diffuse in
the network.
Social learning and assessment of neighbor reliability are essentially interpersonal
phenomena; weighting of links between agents in real social networks has a myriad of
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causes beyond simple observation of choice patterns. Social influence can be caused by
different forms of persuasion or coercion, and there are various paths by which beliefs
are adopted and internalized (Albarrac´ın et al. 2010). Questions of optimal behavior
inevitably become entangled with social constructs such as identity and tradition. Net-
work structure—to whom one is linked—is also not likely to be random, but driven
by the content of communicated information, and private signals are not likely to be
independent. Since all this would confound our attempt to identify the causal effect
of reliability perception contingent on behavior, we relied on an experimental setting
where agents are not known to each other, and networks and signals are randomly
assigned.
While we do find that individuals tend to develop incorrect perceptions about the
reliability of their peers, it would be a mistake to conclude that they are inherently
naive or irrational. As mentioned before, the cognitive cost of determining the statisti-
cally optimal choice might be too high, especially if individuals must constantly process
different information, possibly delivered over the various social networks to which they
belong. The heuristic rules they adopt likely balance optimality and parsimony, and
respond—in real social networks—to implicit connotations of behaviors such as stub-
bornness or nonconformity. Thus our experiment’s aim was not to examine learning
errors, but to create an abstract setting allowing us to highlight how the heuristic rules
of social learning are sensitive to observed behavior.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2.2 presents the framework with
which we model the social learning process, section 2.3 presents the design of the
experiment, section 2.4 presents the empirical strategy and the econometric model used
to identify the effect of reliability perception on social influence, section 2.5 presents a
summary of the data collected from the experiment, section 3.4 presents our estimation
and inference results, and finally we conclude with section 3.5.
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2.2 Framework
Let G = (V, E) be a graph representing a social network where V = {1, . . . , n} is the
set of nodes representing agents, and E = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ V and i 6= j} is the set of edges
connecting nodes, representing communication channels. We assume that all graphs
are undirected, so if (i, j) ∈ E , then (j, i) ∈ E . Let A = A(G) be the adjacency matrix,
such that [A]ij = 1((i, j) ∈ E). For any i, let N(i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}, represent i’s
neighborhood. Let time be discrete and finite such that t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
To capture how central an agent is in a network, there are a variety of measures
such as (i) degree centrality, the simplest of the measures, based on the number
of neighbors an agent has, di = |N(i)|, (ii) closeness centrality, which depends on
how short the shortest paths are from an agent to all other agents, (iii) betweenness
centrality, which is based on how well positioned an agent i is, measured by the number
of shortest paths between other agents that include i, and (iv) eigenvector centrality,
which is a sophisticated measure of influence or prestige that not only measures the
centrality of an agent using their degree or the length of their shortest paths, but takes
into account the centrality of the neighbors. In this paper, we focus on betweenness
centrality since it captures how much information flows through a particular agent and
to what extent there are alternative sources of the same information. Betweenness
centrality is calculated as
Betweennessj =
∑
k 6=l:j /∈{k,l}
Pj(k, l)/P (k, l)
(n− 1)(n− 2)/2 (2.1)
where Pj(k, l) is the number of shortest paths between k and l that include j, and
P (k, l) is the total number of shortest paths between k and l. In our main analysis,
we use a variation on betweenness centrality that is pair specific: pairwise betweenness
centrality. It captures how much information must flow through a neighbor j to reach
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i
Betweennessji =
∑
k 6=i:j /∈{k,i}
Pj(k, i)/P (k, i)
(n− 1)(n− 2)/2 . (2.2)
When we use the betweenness centrality measure in (2.1) we will refer to it as absolute
betweenness centrality (Jackson 2008).
Let the unobservable true state of the world be θ ∈ {0, 1}, determined randomly
with probability Pr(θ = 0) = Pr(θ = 1) = 12 . Each agent receives, at time t = 0,
a private signal si ∈ {0, 1}, with a known probability Pr(si = θ|θ) = 1 − Pr(si =
1− θ|θ) > 12 . At every t > 0, each agent makes a choice yit ∈ [0, 1]. After every choice,
each agent can earn an unobservable payoff piit ∈ {0, 1} with probability Sθ(yit) =
Pr(pi = 1|θ, yit). After a choice yit is made, i can observe the history of choices of
j ∈ N(i) at s ≤ t. At every period, agents hold a belief pit = Pr(θ = 1|Iit) where
Iit is the information they have received from their private signal, and at t > 1, from
their neighbors’, and their own, observed past choices {yhs : h ∈ N(i)∪{i} and s < t}.
Sθ(yit) is a proper scoring rule
4, if at all t every risk neutral agent’s optimal choice is
the same as their belief
pit = arg max
yit
pit · S1(yit) + (1− pit) · S0(yit)
2.2.1 DeGroot Learning
Given the above framework and that agents aim to maximize their ex post utility, a
pure DeGroot learning model would have agents updating their beliefs (and hence the
choices they make) using a dynamic weighted averaging rule
yit =
1− ∑
j∈N(i)
wijt
 yi,t−1 + ∑
j∈N(i)
wijtyj,t−1 (2.3)
4Nyarko et al. 2002.
37
where wijt represents the weight that i places on the belief/choice of j at t, and
wijt ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
h∈N(i)∪{i}
wiht = 1.
In most DeGroot specifications weighting is a function of neighbors’ exogenous charac-
teristics, such as their network centrality
wijt = w(xjit,x−jit)
where xjit is a scalar measure of some characteristic of j, from i’s perspective, at t. For
example, xjit = Betweennessji,∀t. x−jit is a vector of the same characteristics of all
h ∈ N(i)\{j}. In this paper, we wish to introduce neighbors’ observed choices as input
to the weighting function: we want to test whether the vector of observed neighbors’
choices would enter the DeGroot learning process, not only as a multiplicand in (2.3)
but also a determinant of the function w(·)
wijt = w(xjit,x−jit,yi(t),yj(t),Y−j(t)) (2.4)
where yk(t) is a vector of all observed choices of k at s < t, and Y−j(t) is a matrix of
all observed choices of h ∈ N(i) \ {j} at s < t.
2.2.2 Measures of Observed Behavior
It is of interest to see how agents interpret three particular behaviors when assessing
the reliability of their neighbors. These choices could be seen as either an indication
of having better information or better information processing skills, or they could be
viewed as a sign of inattention to new information. They are also likely to interact
with the more objective measure of network centrality to modify the perception of
reliability. For example, a neighbor with high pairwise betweenness centrality is one
through whom a greater part of the information in the network must pass, and hence
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greater trust might be placed on them.
Choice Variability
The first measure of observed behavior considered is how much an agent is observed
to vary their choices from t = 1 till the last observed period. Choice variability is the
standard deviation of j’s observed history of choices, measured as
V ariabilityjt =
√√√√ 1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
(
yjτ − y¯j(t−1)
)2
where
y¯j(t) =
1
t
t∑
τ=1
yjτ .
This measure captures the inverse of stubbornness as formulated by Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi (2010). As this measure increases, it indicates that an
individual is becoming less stubborn. Too much variability should signify excessive
volatility. Should agents be unresponsive to the very low variability of their peers, or
should they attribute greater reliability to it, it would be possible for stubborn agents
to garner excessive social influence.
Nonconformity
This measure is based on an agents’ observed lack of conformity. Nonconformity of
agent j, observed by i at t, is measured as
Nonconformjit = |yj,t−1 − y¯i,−j,t−1|
where
y¯i,−j,t =
1
|(N(i) \ {j}) ∪ {i}|
∑
h∈(N(i)\{j})∪{i}
yht.
It is a simple measure of how much a neighbor is observed to have made a choice
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different from the mean choice of i’s other neighbors. It is unique to every pair of
network neighbors, since agents must make a nonconformity assessment based only on
the limited information of their network neighborhood.
The nonconformity measure is related to the phenomenon of homophily, the ten-
dency of individuals to form social links with those who hold similar views. In our
study we hold the network structure static and do not allow agents to endogenously
form their social network. However, our framework does not force agents to listen
to their exogenously chosen peers; they have some leeway to disassociate with a peer
(while they have none in establishing new social links). Therefore, homophily can be
observed if agents perceive nonconformity as unreliability.
Choice Extremity
The last and perhaps simplest measure of behavior is the extremity of an agent’s choice:
the level of confidence an agent has about their belief that the true state of the world
is a particular one. Choice extremity is measured as
Extremityjt =
∣∣∣∣yj,t−1 − 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Since a choice of y = 12 means being indifferent between the two possible states
of the world, a move towards 0 or 1 shows how much an agent is leaning towards a
particular possibility. It is perhaps a signal of real unreliability in earlier time periods
when agents have not yet received sufficient information to justify holding extreme
views. However, in later periods, the extremity of a neighbor’s choice should affect the
weighting average an agent would update to, but not the weighting rule itself.
2.3 Experiment Design
Replicating the framework described in section 2.2, the experiments used for this paper
placed eight human subjects at different nodes of a network and they were asked to
40
repeatedly declare their best guess about the state of the world, with the understanding
that they would earn a monetary reward depending on how accurate their answers
were, after the experiment is concluded. Before their first guess is made, they were
given a hint (private signal) about the true state of the world. They then repeatedly
made guesses over 20 rounds (time periods) and were permitted to ‘communicate’ in
a restricted fashion with their network neighbors: they were able to observe their
neighbors’ history of past choices, as well as their own, and in turn they understood
that their guesses would be observable to their neighbors in future rounds.
Subjects were recruited via an internet labor market web site, Amazon Mechanical
Turk, which is primarily used to hire workers to carry out tasks difficult to automate5,
such as identifying the content of images or updating a database of restaurant phone
numbers. This experiment is not the first behavioral experiment to be conducted using
an online labor market6, but its social dimension, whereby a group of subjects are
required to make choices interactively, is unique.
The experiment was posted as a task requiring as many assignments as we needed
human subjects. Workers were able to see a description of the experiment and see
what the experiment environment would look like. Once they decided to participate
they were directed to our web application, specifically developed for the purpose of
this study. Before participating in the actual experiment, subjects also needed to
pass a qualification test, and to acknowledge their understanding and approval of a
participation consent statement. The qualification test was created to ensure subjects’
understanding of the experiment’s environment: what their goal is; the meaning of the
choices they can make and the hint they will receive; what the network diagram they
will be presented with means and how they will be able to communicate with others;
basic understanding of probability; and how they will be rewarded.
The two possible states of the world in an experiment were represented as two
5Such tasks are referred to as Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
6For studies on the effectiveness of online lab experiments see Horton et al. (2011) and Berinsky
et al. (2012)
41
different shapes, such as a triangle and circle or square and star. At the start of
the experiment a highlighted box appeared on participants’ screens with one of the
possible states of the world as a hint that they understood was correct 2/3 of the time.
During the actual experiment agents interacted with a web page with (a) a diagram
of their network, with their position identified, and each agent identified with a unique
letter; (b) a table of the history of their own and their neighbors’ choices; (c) a discrete
scale from 0 to 10 with which they input their guesses once all their neighbors have
made their choice in the previous round; and, (d) available if needed, the experiment’s
instructions.
Since the experimental treatment in this study is exposure to varying levels of the
choice patterns we wish to study, there was concern at the design phase of the exper-
iment that human subjects would not naturally behave in the extreme ways we were
interested in. Therefore, automated participants, or automata, were inserted in the
experiment in the place of a human subject, and programmed to simulate the extreme
levels of behavior needed. To avoid deceiving our subjects we make use of the Condi-
tional Information Lottery experiment design (Bardsley 2000): subjects are required
to participate in two experiments—each with its own hint, network, and possible states
of the world—one of which will randomly have an automaton; and their reward will be
based only on their choices in the all-humans experiment. They know there will be an
automaton but do not know in which experiment and which participant it is, therefore
it is expected that they would behave as if neither had an automaton. However, in
the pilot experiments, we found that human subjects do provide us with many of the
extreme choice patterns needed. We ended up relying on the automata to introduce
some of the rare levels of extreme choice nonconformity.
The other experimental treatment we are interested in studying is betweenness
network centrality (and ultimately how it interacts with choice patterns). Twelve
networks of size n = 8 were selected to maximize the variability in betweennness
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Figure 2.1: Networks Used in Experiments
centrality (shown in Figure 2.1). We found that networks of a smaller size did not
provide us with a sufficient variety, and larger networks made our experiments less
robust to the occasional inattention or experiment abandonment by subjects. (Figure
2.2 presents the betweenness and pairwise betweenness centrality distributions).
Due to concerns that subjects would be able to communicate with each other outside
the restricted channels of the experiment, steps were taken to disguise which experiment
any particular subject was in, such that two subjects able to communicate outside the
experiment would not be able to easily identify if they are in the same experiment,
since multiple experiments are typically done simultaneously. We do this by make the
pair of symbols representing the states of the world and the letter identifiers of agents
in a network unique to each subject; the way they were actually coded (e.g. 0 or 1 of
the states of the world) is not revealed.
Finally, after the experiment was concluded all subjects were paid a fixed partici-
pation fee and the bonuses they earned from every choice they made, using a lottery
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depending on their accuracy. All monetary transaction were done through Mechanical
Turk.
2.3.1 Proper Scoring Rule
As mentioned in section 2.2, in order to elicit subjects’ beliefs, we rely on a proper
scoring rule. This reward schedule is structured so as to make it optimal for risk
neutral subjects to make choices equal to their beliefs, yit = pit. In this experiment, at
every period of the experiment, subjects are faced with a lottery to earn a fixed reward7
with a probability depending on the accuracy of their choices, and zero otherwise. The
scoring rule used is therefore the probability of earning a reward, taking the quadratic
form
S0(yit) = 1− y2it
S1(yit) = 2yit − y2it
7referred to as a “bonus” in the experiment
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Relaxing the risk neutrality assumption, it becomes optimal for agents to make
choices closer to 1/2 as risk aversion increases (Armantier et al. 2013). However, in
an early pilot with a linear scoring rule, it was observed that subjects tended to make
choices close to 0 and 1. Therefore, risk neutrality was viewed as a greater threat to
eliciting beliefs. The main reason we wish to elicit choices that are not concentrated
at either extreme of the choice spectrum is to make the behavior patterns we wish to
study, such as nonconformity, more salient to subjects.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
Agents update their beliefs based on their own and their neighbors’ expressed beliefs
at time t− 1, following the statistical DeGroot model based on (2.3)
yit =
1− ∑
j∈N(i)
wijt
 yi,t−1 + ∑
j∈N(i)
wijtyj,t−1 + c1i + εit
yit − yi,t−1 =
∑
j∈N(i)
wijt · (yj,t−1 − yi,t−1) + c1i + εit
∆yit =
∑
j∈N(i)
wijt∆yji,t−1 + c1i + εit (2.5)
which can be expressed as: the change in i’s choice at time t, is dependent on the
weighted average of the difference between i’s choice and the choices of the set of
neighbors N(i), at t− 1; a time invariant fixed effect for i; and an error term.
The model assumes sequential exogeneity, such that
E[εit|{yis : s < t}, {yjs : j ∈ N(i), s < t}, c1i] =
E[εit|yi,t−1, {yj,t−1 : j ∈ N(i)}, c1i] = 0.
The fully dynamic conditional mean E[∆yit|{yis : s < t}, {yjs : j ∈ N(i), s < t}, c1i]
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depends on only one lag of one’s choices and neighbors’ choices (per the DeGroot model
(2.3)).
As in (2.4), the weights agents place on their neighbor are modeled as a function
of their neighbors’ network position and choice patterns. Such a function describes the
allocation of weights over self and neighbors, and hence should take a nonlinear form
as in the multinomial fractional model (Wooldridge 2010). In order to keep our model
linear, allowing us to deal with fixed effects in a significantly simpler way, we assume
that the relative excess or deficit weight placed on neighbor j takes a linear form. What
is meant by excess or deficit weight is the difference between the actual, unobserved,
weight wijt and the weight w¯i = 1/|N(i)∪{i}|, which is the weight that would have been
allocated to self and neighbors had the learning process been an unweighted averaging
process. This difference captures to what extent a neighbor is influential—viewed as
reliable. It is specified in relative terms—divided by w¯i—so the interpretation of the
parameters is applicable to agents of any degree.
w˜ijt =
wijt − w¯i
w¯i
= z′jitβ + c2it + νijt
w˜iit =
wiit − w¯i
w¯i
= νiit
(2.6)
where zjit is a vector j’s betweenness centrality measure and observed choice patterns
at t. The time variant fixed effect c2it captures unobservable time varying heterogene-
ity, such as increasing self weight, and ensuring that
∑
h∈N(i)∪{i}wiht = 1 remains
true. We are thus assuming that agents make two types of weighting decisions: they
decide how much to allocate to themselves, and distribute the remaining weight over
neighbors depending on their relative perceived reliability. Again, we assume sequential
exogeneity, such that
E[νijt|zji1, . . . , zjit, c2it] = E[νijt|zjit, c2it] = 0.
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We do not observe wijt or w˜ijt directly and therefore we cannot estimate (2.6)
directly. We need to substitute (2.6) into (2.5) in order to estimate β. But first we
eliminate c2it by demeaning (2.6) by
∑
h∈N(i)∪{i} w˜ijt
|N(i)| =
z¯′jitβ︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j∈N(i) z
′
jitβ
|N(i)| +c2it +
ν¯ijt︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j∈N(i) νijt
|N(i)| = 0
which equals zero since
∑
h∈N(i)∪{i} w˜iht = 0. This gives us
w˜ijt =(zjit − z¯jit)′β + c2it − c2it + νijt − ν¯ijt
w˜ijt =z˜
′
ijtβ + ν˜ijt (2.7)
where z˜ and ν˜ are the demeaned versions of z and ν.
In order to introduce (2.7) into (2.5) we need to transform it to be in terms of w˜ijt
instead of wijt. We do this by subtracting w¯i
∑
j ∆yji,t−1 from (2.5)
∆yit − w¯i
∑
j
∆yji,t−1 =w¯i
∑
j∈N(i)
(wijt − w¯i)
w¯i
∆yji,t−1 + c1i + εit
∆yit − w¯i
∑
j
∆yji,t−1 =w¯i
∑
j∈N(i)
w˜ijt∆yji,t−1 + c1i + εit
∆yit −
∑
j ∆yji,t−1
|N(i)|+ 1 =
∑
j w˜ijt∆yji,t−1
|N(i)|+ 1 + c1i + εit (2.8)
Substituting (2.7) in (2.8) gives us the estimating equation
∆yit −
∑
j ∆yji,t−1
|N(i)|+ 1 =
∑
j z˜
′
jitβ∆yji,t−1
|N(i)|+ 1 + c1i +
∑
j ν˜ijt∆yji,t−1
|N(i)|+ 1 + εit
∆yit −
∑
j ∆yji,t−1
|N(i)|+ 1 =
∑
j z˜jit∆yji,t−1
|N(i)|+ 1 · β + c1i + ηit (2.9)
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We can then use first differencing to eliminate c1i and use lagged versions of
1
|N(i) + 1|
∑
j
z˜jit∆yji,t−1
as instruments (Wooldridge 2010). (refer to appendix A for tests of the instruments’
relevance).
2.5 Data
Data collection was concluded after running 63 experiments, each with seven or eight
subjects, depending on whether an automated agent was present, and lasting 20 time
periods. One hundred and eighty-seven unique subjects participated and there was a
total of 266 participations. Overall, we observed human subjects making 8,499 choices.
The experiments were conducted over a two months period8. In the following sub-
section, we discuss our method of measuring empirical beliefs, since we were not able
to observe them directly. The choices data that we observe and the choice patterns
based on them are summarized in Figure 2.4. In addition to the observed choices, we
also plot our estimated empirical beliefs.
2.5.1 Empirical Beliefs
As mentioned in section 2.3.1, we use a quadratic proper scoring rule to elicit beliefs,
mostly to prevent the concentration of choices at either 0 or 1, due to risk neutrality.
What we observe in our data is more nuanced as demonstrated in Figure 2.3, showing
examples of the evolution of choices for four subjects, over 20 periods. As shown,
many of the observed choices tend to fluctuate around what we assume are true beliefs.
Therefore, both we, the researchers, and the experiment subjects are confronted with
the task of inducing beliefs from noisy choice patterns.
8Prior to this, three pilot runs were conducted to test and fix some flaws in the experiment web
application and the reward scheme used.
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Our explanation for this noise is that agents, aside from making random errors, do
not only maximize their expected payoff, but also attempt to solve a variance minimiza-
tion problem—minimizing the possibility of a catastrophic outcome, earning a payoff
of zero9. As a simple illustration, consider a single risk neutral agent having to make
choices over two periods, y1 and y2, while holding the belief p = 0.5 that θ = 1, in a
setting otherwise similar to that in section 2.2. The optimal choice for such an agent
would be to choose y1 = y2 = 0.5, with an expected payoff of 1.5 and variance 0.375. If
that agent had chosen y1 = 1 and y2 = 0, she would have had a lower expected payoff
of 1, but would bring the variance down to 0, eliminating completely the possibility of
earning 0. The choices we observe do not necessarily go to such extremes, but fluctuate
in a manner suggesting variance reduction.
9They are adopting a “safety first” rule (Roy 1952; Pyle et al. 1970).
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Figure 2.3: Examples of Agents’ Choices Over Time
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Figure 2.3 shows the smoothing of observed choices, using (i) local regression
(LOESS), a non-parametric linear weighted least squares regression using a window
of past and future choices10, and (ii) a running average of the current observed choice
and one lagged choice. We refer to the former as yˆnit and the latter yˆ
m
it , and use them
as estimates of true unobserved beliefs yit. On the left-hand side of the estimation
equation (2.9), we use the smoother yˆnit that we assume is a more precise measure of
beliefs, and on the right-hand side we use less precise yˆmit ; our reasoning being that while
agents should have an exact knowledge of their beliefs, they must attempt to smooth
out their neighbors’ observed choices to infer what their beliefs are. We allow them to
use the more limited estimation of running averages using two past observations. This,
however, introduces measurement error, which we define as
rnit = yˆ
n
it − yit
rmit = yˆ
m
it − yoit
(yit is the true unobserved belief and y
o
it is the true inferred belief of i by her neighbors).
The instrumental variable approach used in our empirical strategy should produce
consistent estimators, as we make the assumption that the running mean smoothed
choices are uncorrelated with both types of errors: Cov(yˆmit , r
m
is ) = 0 and Cov(yˆ
m
it , r
n
is) =
0, ∀t, s. The first part of the assumption says that the degree of failure to properly mea-
sure true inferred beliefs is uncorrelated with the value of the smoothed measure; our
‘best guess’ for what agent i’s peers infer her beliefs to be, yˆmit , is uncorrelated with the
error yˆmit −yoit. The second part says that the type of error made by us, the researchers,
in measuring what an agent knows about her beliefs, rnit, is uncorrelated with our mea-
sure of what an agent infers her neighbors’ beliefs are, yˆmit . It is important to make
clear the difference between the two types of measurement error: rnit is the researchers’
10We use the loess function of the stats R package, with the default parameter α = 0.75 and using
a quadratic model (R Core Team 2013).
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Observed and Smoothed Behavior
error in measuring true beliefs since we assume they would be known without error to
agents by introspection, and rmit is the the researchers’ error in measuring the beliefs of
agents as they are inferred by their neighbors.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Reliability Perception
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Table 2.1: Estimation of Partial Effects of Choice Patterns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Betweennessji -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.15*** 0.18 -0.04 1.79** 0.89** 1.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.14) (0.71) (0.37) (0.42)
Nonconformjit 0.04 0.06* 0.07* 0.07**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
V ariabilityjt -0.00 0.29** 0.03 0.21** 0.02 0.54**
(0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.23)
(V ariabilityjt)
2 -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.16***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
Extremityjt 0.04* 0.45** 0.10** 0.09**
(0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (0.04)
Betweennessji ×Nonconformjit -0.07** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Betweennessji × V ariabilityjt -0.12 0.20 -0.14 -0.58**
(0.07) (0.19) (0.09) (0.25)
Betweennessji × (V ariabilityjt)2 -0.09 0.15**
(0.07) (0.07)
Betweennessji × Extremityjt -0.86** -0.20** -0.24**
(0.34) (0.09) (0.10)
Joint Signif. F -test (All) 2.12 0.05 69.68*** 4.14 14.96*** 7.23* 69.53*** 6.71* 56.54*** 59.11***
[0.35] [0.98] [0.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Nonconformity) 13.02*** 9.46*** 7.99**
[0.00] [0.01] [0.02]
Joint Signif. F -test (Variability) 50.13*** 5.72* 58.04*** 5.31* 14.92***
[0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Extremity) 6.57** 5.21* 5.28*
[0.04] [0.07] [0.07]
Adjusted R2 0.0005 0.0143 0.0005 0.0005 0.0022 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0029 0.0012
N 5971 5971 5971 5971 5971 5971 5971 5971 5971 5971 5971
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘*’ is 10 percent, ‘**’ is 5 percent, and ‘***’ is 1 percent.
b Robust standard errors reported between () and p-values for joint hypothesis tests between []
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Figure 2.5: Nonconformity Regression Curve: The vertical lines represent the 10th and
90th percentiles of nonconformity. The range of the x-axis is over all the observed
values.
Our main regression results estimating the partial effects of the choice patterns we
are investigating—choice variability, nonconformity, and choice extremity—are shown
in Tables 2.1-2.6. First, in Table 2.1, we study how choice patterns affect weighting in
a linear fashion. Second, in Table 2.2, we examine how choice patterns might influence
weighting differently depending on the level of the choice pattern, by adding quadratic
terms. Finally, in Tables 2.4-2.6, we study how response to both choice patterns and
network centrality changes over time by interacting the regressors in previous analysis
with a linear experiment round trend. In all tables we consider a particular choice
pattern on its own and in the last column include all of them in the same regression.
The second column in all tables shows the F -statistic for a joint hypothesis on the
significance of the instruments used for each row in a first stage regression.
In Table 2.1 we are only able to detect the linear effect of nonconformity (and be-
tweenness centrality) when we introduce the nonconformity/betweenness interaction
term. We see in columns (5) and (8) that nonconformity has a positive and significant
effect, and from the interaction term we see that the effect diminishes as betweenness
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Table 2.2: Estimation of Partial Effects of Choice Patterns (Quadratic
Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Betweennessji -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 2.05***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.78)
Nonconformjit 0.19** 0.50**
(0.09) (0.20)
(Nonconformjit)
2 -0.02** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.02)
V ariabilityjt 0.29** 0.84**
(0.14) (0.36)
(V ariabilityjt)
2 -0.09*** -0.25**
(0.04) (0.10)
Extremityjt -0.16** -0.12***
(0.06) (0.04)
(Extremityjt)
2 0.04** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
Joint Signif. F -test (All) 17.67*** 69.68*** 9.46** 171.42***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Nonconformity) 17.50*** 12.62**
[0.00] [0.01]
Joint Signif. F -test (Variability) 50.13*** 41.43***
[0.00] [0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Extremity) 9.35*** 11.52**
[0.01] [0.02]
Joint Signif. F -test (Nonconformity × Bet.) 7.14**
[0.03]
Joint Signif. F -test (Variability × Bet.) 7.90**
[0.02]
Joint Signif. F -test (Extremity × Bet.) 5.50*
[0.06]
Adjusted R2 0.0060 0.0005 0.0009 0.0010
N 5971 5971 5971 5971
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘*’ is 10 percent, ‘**’ is 5 percent, and ‘***’ is 1 percent.
b Robust standard errors reported between () and p-values for joint hypothesis tests between
[]
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Table 2.3: Estimation of Partial Effects of Choice Patterns with Interactions
(Quadratic Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Betweennessji 0.59*** -0.04 0.38** 2.05***
(0.20) (0.14) (0.17) (0.78)
Nonconformjit 0.41** 0.50**
(0.17) (0.20)
(Nonconformjit)
2 -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02)
V ariabilityjt 0.21** 0.84**
(0.09) (0.36)
(V ariabilityjt)
2 -0.06*** -0.25**
(0.02) (0.10)
Extremityjt -0.13*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.04)
(Extremityjt)
2 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
Betweennessji ×Nonconformjit -0.52*** -0.56***
(0.19) (0.21)
Betweennessji × (Nonconformjit)2 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02)
Betweennessji × V ariabilityjt 0.20 -1.28***
(0.19) (0.46)
Betweennessji × (V ariabilityjt)2 -0.09 0.35***
(0.07) (0.13)
Betweennessji × Extremityjt -0.15 -0.55**
(0.10) (0.27)
Betweennessji × (Extremityjt)2 -0.01 0.07*
(0.01) (0.04)
Joint Signif. F -test (All) 27.73*** 69.53*** 15.01** 171.42***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Nonconformity) 27.15*** 12.62**
[0.00] [0.01]
Joint Signif. F -test (Variability) 58.04*** 41.43***
[0.00] [0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Extremity) 14.78*** 11.52**
[0.01] [0.02]
Joint Signif. F -test (Nonconformity × Bet.) 7.54** 7.14**
[0.02] [0.03]
Joint Signif. F -test (Variability × Bet.) 2.46 7.90**
[0.29] [0.02]
Joint Signif. F -test (Extremity × Bet.) 7.59** 5.50*
[0.02] [0.06]
Adjusted R2 0.0016 0.0000 0.0016 0.0010
N 5971 5971 5971 5971
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘*’ is 10 percent, ‘**’ is 5 percent, and ‘***’ is 1 percent.
b Robust standard errors reported between () and p-values for joint hypothesis tests between []
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Figure 2.6: Choice Variability Regression Curve: The vertical lines represent the 10th
and 90th percentiles of choice variability. The range of the x-axis is over all the observed
values.
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Figure 2.7: Choice Extremity Regression Line: The range of the x-axis is over all the
observed values.
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Table 2.4: Estimation of Partial Effects of Choice Patterns over
Time (Nonconformity)
(1) (2) (3)
Betweennessji 0.44* 1.23* 9.12**
(0.23) (0.68) (4.63)
Betweennessji × t -0.05** -0.07 -0.71*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.37)
Nonconformjit 1.30* 2.21**
(0.66) (1.06)
Nonconformjit × t -0.10** -0.20**
(0.05) (0.09)
(Nonconformjit)
2 -0.14** -0.25**
(0.06) (0.11)
(Nonconformjit)
2 × t 0.01** 0.02**
(0.00) (0.01)
Betweennessji ×Nonconformjit -1.27** -2.69**
(0.59) (1.21)
Betweennessji ×Nonconformjit × t 0.10** 0.25**
(0.04) (0.11)
Betweennessji × (Nonconformjit)2 0.19** 0.36**
(0.08) (0.15)
Betweennessji × (Nonconformjit)2 × t -0.02** -0.04**
(0.01) (0.02)
Joint Signif. F -test (All) 4.39 23.35***
[0.11] [0.01]
Joint Signif. F -test (Any × t) 10.41** 63.47***
[0.03] [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
N 5971 5971 5971
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘*’ is 10 percent, ‘**’ is 5 percent,
and ‘***’ is 1 percent.
b Blank joint hypothesis results are due to “computational non-singularity”
at that specification.
c Robust standard errors reported between () and p-values for joint hypoth-
esis tests between []
d The last columns in Tables 2.4-2.6 are for the same regression controlling
for all behaviors
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Table 2.5: Estimation of Partial Effects of Choice Pat-
terns over Time (Choice Variability)
(1) (2)
Betweennessji 1.43* 9.12**
(0.79) (4.63)
Betweennessji × t -0.17** -0.71*
(0.09) (0.37)
V ariabilityjt 1.97** 3.94**
(0.86) (1.74)
V ariabilityjt × t -0.24** -0.47**
(0.10) (0.20)
(V ariabilityjt)
2 -0.53** -1.13**
(0.22) (0.49)
(V ariabilityjt)
2 × t 0.07** 0.14**
(0.03) (0.06)
Betweennessji × V ariabilityjt -1.93** -7.32**
(0.94) (3.11)
Betweennessji × V ariabilityjt × t 0.27** 0.69**
(0.13) (0.29)
Betweennessji × (V ariabilityjt)2 0.52* 2.17**
(0.29) (0.88)
Betweennessji × (V ariabilityjt)2 × t -0.08** -0.23**
(0.04) (0.10)
Joint Signif. F -test (All) 124.96***
[0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Any × t) 7.74 63.47***
[0.10] [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.0000 0.0000
N 5971 5971
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘*’ is 10 percent, ‘**’ is
5 percent, and ‘***’ is 1 percent.
b Blank joint hypothesis results are due to “computational non-
singularity” at that specification.
c Robust standard errors reported between () and p-values for
joint hypothesis tests between []
d The last columns in Tables 2.4-2.6 are for the same regression
controlling for all behaviors
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Table 2.6: Estimation of Partial Effects of Choice Pat-
terns over Time (Choice Extremity)
(1) (2)
Betweennessji -0.79 9.12**
(0.49) (4.63)
Betweennessji × t 0.08 -0.71*
(0.05) (0.37)
Extremityjt 0.30 -0.81
(0.34) (0.52)
Extremityjt × t 0.01 0.14*
(0.03) (0.07)
(Extremityjt)
2 0.05 0.26*
(0.07) (0.14)
(Extremityjt)
2 × t -0.01 -0.04**
(0.01) (0.02)
Betweennessji × Extremityjt 1.18* -1.98
(0.69) (1.40)
Betweennessji × Extremityjt × t -0.17* 0.13
(0.09) (0.10)
Betweennessji × (Extremityjt)2 -0.18 0.15
(0.13) (0.20)
Betweennessji × (Extremityjt)2 × t 0.03* -0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Joint Signif. F -test (All) 30.18***
[0.00]
Joint Signif. F -test (Any × t) 5.39 63.47***
[0.25] [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.0004 0.0000
N 5971 5971
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘*’ is 10 percent, ‘**’
is 5 percent, and ‘***’ is 1 percent.
b Blank joint hypothesis results are due to “computational
non-singularity” at that specification.
c Robust standard errors reported between () and p-values for
joint hypothesis tests between []
d The last columns in Tables 2.4-2.6 are for the same regression
controlling for all behaviors
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centrality increases. Comparing the results of columns (5) and (8) we see the atten-
uating effect centrality to be stronger. Since this is a linear approximation of these
effects we hold off on making conclusions about a possible reversal of the effect of
nonconformity until we discuss the quadratic specifications below.
We are not able to detect any effect of choice variability, while our F test rejects
the hypothesis that both the main and the interacted variability terms are jointly equal
to zero, with a p-value of 0.06. This is likely due to the different ways that low and
high variability is perceived, therefore, we are only able to find a significant effect in
the quadratic specifications’ results below.
As for choice extremity, we find a significant positive effect in both the interacted
and non-interacted specifications. In the interaction specification, we observe a dimin-
ishing effect in response to increased centrality. Comparing columns (7) and (8), the
direction of effect do not change, but there is drop in terms of magnitude, suggesting
perhaps some bias when other choice patterns are omitted.
In Table 2.2 we introduce quadratic terms for all the choice pattern terms and their
interactions. Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 help use visualize how the partial effects of choice
patterns change in a nonlinear way. We use the estimates from column (7) and report
at two levels of betweenness centrality: a ‘low’ value (the 20th percentile) and a ‘high’
value (the 80th percentile). Vertical lines are also used to identify the 10th and 90th
percentiles of nonconformity and choice variability.
For nonconformity, as seen in columns (1), (2), and (7), we see that it continues
to have a positive effect on weighting, and the quadratic terms suggest a diminishing
effect as nonconformity becomes very high. The betweenness centrality interaction
terms, as in the linear specification, also play a diminishing role on the response to
nonconformity. In column (7), including all observed behavior measures, results show
a similar effect to nonconformity albeit at a greater magnitude. In Figure 2.5, we
clearly see that nonconformity has a strong positive effect (the downward part of the
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curve is for a range of values with few observation). For the high betweenness curve it
is clear that betweenness is the main effect and the partial effect of nonconformity is
positive but relatively weak.
With respect to choice variability, in columns (3), (4) and (7) we start to detect the
inverted U-shaped effect of variability. The estimated effects demonstrates how agents
with very low or very high variability are perceived as unreliable. We do not find any
significant effect when interacting variability with betweenness centrality in column (4),
and we are not able to reject the joint hypothesis that betweenness centrality interacted
with both variability terms is insignificant. However, in column (7), we find the same
inverted U-shaped effect, with an upward jump in magnitude, and the betweenness
centrality interactions show a strong, significant, downward effect, a similar attenuating
effect as observed with nonconformity, which we clearly see in Figure 2.6 in comparing
the regression curve at low and high betweenness (the downward part of the curve is
also mostly for values with few observations).
With respect to choice extremity, we find that initial increases—moves away from
5—reduce the perception of reliability, and as extremity continues to increase we ob-
serve a strong reversal: agents with very high levels of extremity are viewed as increas-
ingly reliable. Interactions with betweenness centrality, in column (6), are not signif-
icant, but we fail to reject that both interactions are jointly insignificant. Estimates
from column (7), shown in Figure 2.7, suggest, for low centrality agents, a somewhat
flat or shallow decline in perceived reliability at the lower range of choice extremity,
while at the higher range of extremity they start to gain in reliability. Results also
suggest that, unlike other choice patterns, agents are more sensitive to choice extrem-
ity as betweenness increases; while high centrality agents remain influential, influence
is reduced as extremity is in the mid ranges.
Finally, in Tables 2.4-2.6, we see that time tends to make agents less responsive to
their neighbors and therefore less likely to make any updates to their choices. from
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the last columns in the three tables (which are from the same regression, including all
behaviors), it is clear that every time interacted term has a small effect of the opposite
sign as the corresponding main effect term. This appears to be true for both choice
patterns and network centrality.
2.6.2 Behavior and Misinformation
We also analyze the relationship between human subjects’ observed behavior and their
reliability at processing information. We use as a measure of true reliability the absolute
difference between a choice and a network’s optimal choice, y∗r , the belief a Bayesian
agent should hold if given the private signals of all agents (experiments are indexed
by r). In columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2.7 we see the results of three fixed
effects regressions estimating the effect of mean nonconformity over all rounds, choice
variability at the last round, and mean choice extremity over all rounds, on our measure
of true reliability, for all agents.
DistOptir =α+ β1Xir + β2Betweennessir + β1Xir ×Betweennessir + cr + εir
where
DistOptir =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|y∗r − yit| ,
Xir is one of
MeanNonconformir =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣y¯N(i) − yit∣∣
LastV ariabilityir =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(y¯iT − yit)2
MeanExtremityir =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣yit − 12
∣∣∣∣
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and cr is an experiment fixed effect and T is the total number of rounds in an experi-
ment.
We see that there is a significant effect of nonconformity on unreliability. We also see
that betweenness centrality negatively affects reliability, unsurprisingly, since it is an
indicator of better information. Finally, the interaction term is significant and positive
suggesting that agents who are going to deviate from more neighbors (ignoring better
information) are more likely to be unreliable. We find that as variability increases
agents’ reliability increases. However, the effect on reliability goes to zero as network
centrality drops. With choice extremity, we find a similar results as with nonconformity,
but without a significant interaction with centrality.
In columns (4)-(9) of Table 2.7 we see the results of three probability linear model
regressions with the binary dependent variable indicating whether an agent’s final round
choice is on the wrong side: her choice was below 1/2 and the true state is 1, or her
choice was above 1/2 and the true state is 0.
In column (4), we observe no change in how nonconformity affects true reliability in
(1). In column (5), we are not able to detect any effect for choice variability. Finally, in
column (6), choice extremity continues to have a positive effect on unreliability except
with no significant effect for centrality or the extremity-centrality interaction.
In columns (7)-(9), we introduce experiment-level measures of behavior. These
measures are meant to capture the partial effect of average experiment nonconformity,
variability and extremity, on the probability that an agent would be misinformed at
the last round, controlling for their own behavior. These regressions are to estimate
how susceptible agents are to being misled by others’ observed behavior. The only
experiment-level behavior that we find has a significant effect on misinformation is
nonconformity. As the average nonconformity increases in a particular experiment,
agents are more likely to be misinformed. The effect of one’s behavior on this misin-
formation is close to that of column (4) but is insignificant.
64
Table 2.7: Behavior and True Reliability Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FE PLM FE PLM Pooled
MeanNonconformir 0.34*** 0.02*** 0.03
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
LastV ariabilityir 0.14 -0.01 0.04
(0.19) (0.08) (0.09)
MeanExtremityir 0.14** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
ExpMeanNonconformr 0.13***
(0.04)
ExpMeanLastV ariabilityr 0.22
(0.55)
ExpMeanExtremityr -0.04
(0.03)
Betweennessi -1.47*** 0.77 -0.82** -0.37*** -0.02 -0.06 -0.25 -0.01 0.18
(0.20) (0.62) (0.33) (0.10) (0.16) (0.13) (0.23) (0.73) (0.27)
MeanNonconformir ×Betweennessi 0.80*** 0.25*** 0.27***
(0.20) (0.06) (0.10)
LastV ariabilityir ×Betweennessi -1.89* -0.06 -0.25
(1.07) (0.38) (0.30)
MeanExtremityir ×Betweennessi 0.20 0.03 0.07
(0.18) (0.06) (0.07)
ExpMeanNonconformr ×Betweennessi -0.09
(0.15)
ExpMeanLastV ariabilityr ×Betweennessi -0.36
(2.07)
ExpMeanExtremityr ×Betweennessi -0.16
(0.14)
N 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.05
a Asterisks indicate significance levels: ‘*’ is 10 percent, ‘**’ is 5 percent, and ‘***’ is 1 percent.
b Robust standard errors reported between ()
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we hypothesized that, in communication social learning, agents’ percep-
tion of their neighbors’ reliability is to a large extent driven by the behavior observed
over time, in conjunction with their neighbors’ network centrality. The choice patterns
we studied were: choice variability, measuring how often neighbors are observed up-
dating their choices; nonconformity, measuring how a neighbor’s choices deviate from
the average of one’s own and other neighbors’ choices; choice extremity, measuring
how extreme neighbors’ choices are in leaning towards either of the possible states of
the world. We investigated this question using a lab experiment conducted via a web
application, and recruited subjects from an online labor market. Networks were chosen
to give us the variety in network centrality needed, and automated agents were used
to introduce some of the more extreme levels of nonconformity.
We found that choice variability increased perceived reliability for peers with low
network centrality, and that agents were unresponsive to the choice variability of their
high centrality neighbors. Stubborn agents would only have their behavior overlooked
if they hold a central position in their network. They would not gain social influence
because of how their stubbornness is perceived as a signal of reliability, but because
their network centrality causes their persistent beliefs to be continually listened to
in spite of their otherwise unreliable behavior. Therefore, we do not rule out the
possibility of stubborn agents spreading misinformation as formulated by Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi (2010), so long as they hold a central position.
We found that nonconformity was seen as a sign of reliability, especially for agents
with low centrality. In other words, exhibiting nonconformity allows non-central in-
dividuals to gain influence in their social network. This has the opposite effect of
homophily; agents are drawn to the views of those most unlike their own. Our experi-
ment does not allow agents to change their social links, but they can change the weight
of any link: they can effectively sever a link by reducing its weight to zero. What our
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findings indicate is that nonconformity actually strengthens links. Rogers (2003) argues
that homophilous links are more “effective” since communication between individuals
of similar attributes, such as education or socioeconomic status, is easier to comprehend
or relate to. On the other hand, heterophilous links contribute to the spread of new
ideas and innovations, and tend to be initiated by those seeking more reliable sources
of information, echoing our findings. Therefore, abstracting in our experiment from
social attributes that might drive homophily, we are left with heterophily driven by the
perception of reliability.
We found that choice extremity increases the perceived reliability of low centrality
agents. For high centrality agents, low extremity is interpreted as a sign of unreliability
and high extremity as reliability. Perhaps with this behavior more than the other two,
it is clear that agents are attributing higher reliability as an intrinsic quality; low
centrality peers are not any better informed, therefore the greater reliability they are
assumed to have must be because of their greater competency at processing information.
We found that agents’ response to their peers’ observed behavior and network cen-
trality diminishes with time. This makes it clear that we are observing an information
learning phenomenon. As time progresses and no new information is provided to the
social network, agents begin to listen less and less to their peers.
To better understand the consequences of reliability inference based on observed
behavior, we analyzed the causal relationship between these behaviors and true relia-
bility. We found that nonconformity has a significant positive effect on unreliability,
and it increases with higher centrality. We also found that agents are much more likely
to be misinformed—hold incorrect beliefs about the state of the world—if there was
a greater level of nonconformity in their network (controlling for their own nonconfor-
mity). With respect to choice variability, we found that it has a significant negative
effect on unreliability as centrality increases. We did not find evidence that agents’ un-
reliability leads to greater misinformation. Finally, choice extremity showed the same
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significant positive effect on unreliability as nonconformity, but did not change with
network centrality and did not lead to more misinformed peers. Thus, all studied be-
haviors to some extent signify misinformation, but only nonconformity is capable of
spreading it in the network.
At first we might be tempted to draw a bleak picture of misinformation, which def-
initely occurs in real societies (think of conspiracy theories or the popularity of pseu-
doscience), but without nonconformity’s perceived reliability (heterophily), innovation
and progress might prove impossible (Rogers 2003). Also, our findings on noncon-
formity suggest that it could serve as an intervention instrument. Socially peripheral
individuals—of low network centrality—could serve as effective targets for an informa-
tional intervention; they might be easier to convince than opinion leaders and nearly as
influential because of their adoption of a new innovation. Consider a health education
intervention targeting vulnerable individuals: their education would spillover into the
rest of their community.
Chapter 3
Health Intervention Through Information
Outreach
3.1 Introduction
Indonesia has had an impressive track record in its human development improvements.
However, there still remain challenges particularly in the areas of child and maternal
health, and education. For that reason, the Indonesian government, in order to address
these disparities and to move closer to meeting the UN’s Millennium Development
Goals, has launched two pilot projects to evaluate possible interventions. This paper
will focus on the Generasi1 project that used an incentivized scheme similar to that
of conditional cash transfers, but instead targeting entire communities. The project
provided villages with block grants to improve various delivery mechanisms that could
potentially improve any of twelve education, and child and maternal health outcomes.
Communities were incentivized by basing 20% of their grant sizes on performance in
prior years. The rationale behind incentivized block grants is that communities are
better positioned to determine the most effective channels through which to improve
their members’ health and education. While conditional cash transfers are aimed at the
demand side, incentivized grant blocks target both demand and supply side obstacles.
For example, for the supply side villages might hire more midwives, while for the
demand side greater outreach effort is conducted to encourage households to immunize
1formally known as Program National Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM)–Generasi Sehat dan Cer-
das (National Community Empowerment Program – Healthy and Smart Generation)
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their children (Kremer et al. 2011; Olken et al. 2011; Olken et al. 2012).
In order evaluate the effectiveness of such incentivization, villages were random-
ized, at the sub-district level, to receive no grants (the control group) or one of two
possible treatments: grants with incentives and grants without incentives. Olken et
al. (2012) carry out an intention-to-treat analysis that is appropriate considering the
black-box nature of the intervention; their aim is to evaluate the provision of grants
as the treatment—no village assigned to receive a particular type of grant failed to
receive it, and no village assigned to the control group received a grant. For the eight
health indicators, they find that incentivized grants had a stronger impact that non-
incentivized grants, and had no effect on education. This effect is strongest on prenatal
visits and immunization rates, which were 5% and 3% higher with incentives, respec-
tively. However, for many indicators, the intention-to-treat effect that they estimated
was not found to be significantly different from zero, and their estimates were mostly
small in magnitude.
In this paper, we improve upon the intention-to-treat analysis by examining possi-
ble heterogeneity in the effect of the intervention on eight of the twelve indicators that
are health related; our aim is to see if for some subpopulations the incentivized block
grants had stronger effects, and that were drowned out in comparing health and edu-
cation choices between groups solely on their block grant assignment. While treatment
compliance in terms of receiving grants was perfect, the actual channels through which
such treatment influences community members’ health and education related choices
are numerous and not possible to manipulate (at least in the Generasi experiment).
Recognizing that variation in how effective the intervention is at reaching different
households, or how responsive households are to the intervention, we adopt the same
approach used in analyzing randomized interventions with partial compliance. We view
the provision of grants as corresponding to randomized assignment while stratifying the
population based on a post-treatment behavior that is likely to capture how effective
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the intervention was at reaching them (corresponding to compliance with assignment).
The post-treatment variable that we stratify upon is a household’s participation in
health information outreach activity in their community (B. C. E. Frangakis et al.
1999; C. E. Frangakis et al. 2002; Duflo et al. 2007; Angrist et al. 2008).
We should be careful to note that we use the term ‘compliance’ here loosely, as
participation in outreach was not explicitly part of the Generasi intervention; villages
were allowed to determine the mechanisms they would exploit in order to improve
the evaluated indicators. In other words, we are using outreach participation as an
intervention relevant proxy of the degree to which households are influenceable by the
community stakeholders managing block grants. Additionally, while it is plausible that
health information outreach actually mediates the intervention’s effect, in our analysis
we do not make any causal claims about outreach (for further discussion on mediation
analysis see Wang et al. 2013; Imai et al. 2011; Pearl 2001; Heckman et al. 2013).
Since we observe households’ outreach participation in response to actual experi-
ment assignment, and not its counterfactual, the subpopulations stratified by outreach
participation are latent ones. However, since for half the households surveyed we have
panel data from baseline and two post-treatment survey waves, we are able to estimate
some average causal effects for different partitions of subpopulations at both baseline
and post-treatment. This allows us to carry out a differences-in-differences analysis,
controlling for time-invariant subpopulation heterogeneity. The subpopulations we are
able to say something about are (i) the subpopulation of those who participate in
information outreach (we are not able to distinguish between those who always do so
and those who only do in response to treatment), and (ii) those who never participate.
The strongest result we find is for the immunization indicator, for which Olken
et al. (2012) do not find a significant incentivization effect. When they consider the
heterogeneity of effect based on baseline immunization levels, they find a significant
3.76% increased effect for incentivization on the 10th percentile. In our analysis, we
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find that, in the final survey wave, immunization rates increased in response to in-
centivized block grants by a significant 12.3% and 14.3% for children aged one year
or younger and children aged six months or younger, respectively, in households that
participated in health information outreach. There was a significant increase in the
effect of non-incentivized versus incentivized treatments, of about 8.5% for both age
range groups. This suggests that the incentivized grants were very effective at improv-
ing immunization rates for the subpopulation characterized by their participation in
outreach activity, which, in the final survey wave was estimated to be almost a quarter
of the total population. In addition, the significance of the average treatment effect
of incentivized grants, for outreach participating households, is robust to a Bonferroni
correction to test significance levels, addressing concerns about testing multiple hy-
potheses2 (Abdi 2007). For health indicators, other than immunization, our findings
are similar to Olken et al. (2012). We only find a significant effect on use of a midwife
for delivery and vitamin A supplements taken.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 3.2 describes the experimental
design of the Generasi program; section 3.3 presents our structural model and identi-
fication strategy, and the econometric model we use to estimate these effects; section
3.4 presents the regression results and discussion; and finally we conclude with section
3.5.
3.2 Experimental Design
The Generasi program began in mid 2007, randomly assigning 264 sub-districts to
receive a non-incentivized block grant, incentivized block grant, or no block grant at
all. All villages within a sub-district received the same treatment. Overall there were
over 3,000 villages included in this intervention. It should be noted that the Generasi
program was implemented as part of the national PNPM program and therefore sub-
2On the other hand, a Bonferroni correction renders the estimated effects on other health outcomes
insignificant.
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districts had received some form of intervention that was not randomized, such as health
information outreach activities—only the assignment of block grants was randomized.
Villages in sub-districts that were assigned block grants received around $10,000
that could be allocated in any way that can affect one of the twelve health and educa-
tion indicators targeted by the intervention. Eight of these indicators were for child and
maternal health which we focus on: prenatal checks, delivery by a trained professional,
postnatal care, child immunization, the number of child weightings, child malnourish-
ment, and the taking of iron and vitamin A supplements. The other four indicators,
not discussed here, were for school enrollment and attendance. The decision on how
block grants were to be spent was made with the assistance of trained facilitators; using
social mapping and discussion groups communities were able to identify the best way
to improve one of the twelve indicators.
As mentioned, one of the treatment arms received incentivized grants. While non-
incentivized villages received 100% of their grant each year, incentivized villages always
received 80% of their grant and the remaining 20% depended on their performance in
improving the twelve health and education indicators, competing with other villages in
their sub-district. Performance was monitored by surveying health providers and using
school administrative data (For further details on the Generasi program see Olken et
al. 2011; Olken et al. 2012).
3.3 Structural and Statistical Models
In this section we formulate the potential outcomes that we will use to identify the
effects of this experiment, adopting the Rubin (1974) framework. First we define the
following:
• Zb ∈ {0, 1, 2} indicates sub-district b’s randomized assignment: control, non-
incentivized treatment, and incentivized treatment, respectively.
• Hkb(z) ∈ {0, 1} indicates household k’s (in sub-district b) potential participation
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in a village health information outreach activity, given randomized assignment
z. We define Hkb = 1 whenever any of the women in the household k responded
that they had participated in a health information outreach activity3 at any time
(such outreach activity was not available pre-treatment).
• Yikbt(z, h) ∈ [0, 1] measures child (or mother) i’s (in household k and sub-district
b, at survey wave t) health service take-up, given randomized assignment z and
household’s outreach participation h.
Since assignment is randomized:
{Yikbt(z, h), Hkb(z);∀z} ⊥⊥ Zb.
3.3.1 Stratification by Outreach
The population of observed children can be stratified according to their household’s
outreach participation, Hkb(z), such that each child ikb belongs to a strata, or subpop-
ulation, Skb ∈ {a, c, v, n}—subpopulations are defined by their compliance to partici-
pating in a health information outreach activity in response to treatment.
• Skb = a, always takers, when Hkb(z) = 1, ∀z
• Skb = c, any compliers, when Hkb(0) = 0, Hkb(1) = Hkb(2) = 1
• Skb = v, incentive compliers, when Hkb(0) = Hkb(1) = 0, Hkb(2) = 1
• Skb = n, never takers, Hkb(z) = 0, ∀z
This stratification depends on the monotonicity assumption
Assumption 1 Hkb(0) ≤ Hkb(1) ≤ Hkb(2), such that we exclude the possibility of a
household participating in an outreach activity with no treatment and not participating
3The exact survey question was: “Was there any health information outreach activity in which you
participated in the last 12 months?”.
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with treatment, or participating with a non-incentivized treatment and not participating
with an incentivized treatment—treatment cannot reduce the probability of household
participating in an outreach activity.
3.3.2 Identification Strategy
Since we are interested in the effect of information outreach on a child’s (or mother’s)
outcome and are not prepared to make the assumption that outreach participation,
Hkb(z), is conditionally independent of outcomes, Yikbt(z, h), we instead focus on the
treatment effect on the partially identifiable subpopulations that choose to participate
in outreach.
A portion of the villages surveyed for this intervention have had the same house-
holds surveyed in the three survey waves (a baseline wave and two treatment waves).
This allows us to use a differences-in-differences strategy to identify the effect of the
intervention on the subpopulations defined by outreach compliance.
Our starting point is
E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t, Skb, Xikb] = α(Skb) + λt + β ·Xikb
where α(Skb) is the subpopulation fixed effect, λt is the time trend, and Xikb are child,
mother and household characteristics. This is the mean of outcome Y at time t for
a child belonging to a household in subpopulation Skb and with characteristics Xkb,
when not participating in health information outreach (Hkb = 0) and being in control
sub-district (Zb = 0). Notice that we assume the parameters λt and β are homogeneous
over the entire population.
Assumption 2 The time trend is independent of the a household’s subpopulation, such
that
E[Yikbt(0, 0)− Yikb1(0, 0)|Skb = s] = λt,∀s.
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Since we cannot perfectly identify the subpopulation every household belongs to—
Skb is not observable—we instead use a subpopulation effect defined by a household’s
outreach decision on receiving treatment. We can partition the population based on
observed post-treatment Zb and Hkb. Table 3.1 shows the partitions we are able to
identify. Thus, we are able to estimate baseline means of outcomes using the panel
households for which we observe, post-treatment, experimental assignment and out-
reach decisions. We replace α(Skb) with
α(Zb, Hkb) = α0 + α1 · 1(Zb = 1) + α2 · 1(Zb = 2) + α3 ·Hkb +
α4 · 1(Zb = 1)×Hkb + α5 · 1(Zb = 2)×Hkb,
and therefore we can estimate4 (t = 1 is baseline)
E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {c, v, n}] = α(Zb = 0, Hkb = 0)
E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb = a] = α(Zb = 0, Hkb = 1)
E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {v, n}] = α(Zb = 1, Hkb = 0)
E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {a, c}] = α(Zb = 1, Hkb = 1)
E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {n}] = α(Zb = 2, Hkb = 0)
E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {a, c, v}] = α(Zb = 2, Hkb = 1)
The regression model that we use is5
Yikbt = α(Zb, Hkb) + λt + β ·Xikb + δ1t · 1(Zb = 1) + δ2t · 1(Zb = 2) +
4dropping covariates to simplify notation
5Perhaps model (3.1) can be written verbosely as:
Yikbt = α(NonIncentiveb, Incentiveb, Outreachkb) + λt + β ·Xikb + ρ1t ·NonIncentiveb + ρ2t · Incentiveb +
ρ3t ·Outreachkb + ρ4t ·NonIncentiveb ×Outreachkb + ρ5t · Incentiveb ×Outreachkb + εikbt
where NonIncentiveb ≡ 1(Zb = 1), Incentiveb ≡ 1(Zb = 2), and Outreachkb ≡ Hkb, and ρ11 = ρ21 =
ρ31 = ρ41 = ρ51 = 0.
76
Table 3.1: Stratification Partitions
Assignment (Zb)
Identifiable
Outreach Subpopulation Yikbt(Zb, Hkb(Zb))|Skb, t > 1Principal Strata
Control (0) {{a}, {c, v, n}} Hkb(0) = 0 Skb ∈ {c, v, n} Yikbt(0, 0)
Hkb(0) = 1 Skb = a Yikbt(0, 1)
Non-Incentive (1) {{a, c}, {v, n}} Hkb(1) = 0 Skb ∈ {v, n} Yikbt(1, 0)
Hkb(1) = 1 Skb ∈ {a, c} Yikbt(1, 1)
Incentive (2) {{a, c, v}, {n}} Hkb(2) = 0 Skb = n Yikbt(2, 0)
Hkb(2) = 1 Skb ∈ {a, c, v} Yikbt(2, 1)
γ1t ·Hkb + γ2t · 1(Zb = 1)×Hkb + γ3t · 1(Zb = 2)×Hkb + εikbt, (3.1)
where δ11 = δ21 = γ11 = γ21 = γ31 = 0, since treatment effects are only applicable
post-treatment. We make the following assumption about the error term
Assumption 3 E[εikbt|t, Skb, Xikb, Hkb] = 0.
We can, therefore, identify the following subpopulation causal effects for all t > 1
(refer to Appendix B for details)
δ1t = E[Yikbt(1, 0)− Yikbt(0, 0)|t, Skb ∈ {v, n}]
= E[Yikbt(1, Hkb(1))− Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t, Skb ∈ {v, n}]
and
δ2t = E[Yikbt(2, 0)− Yikbt(0, 0)|t, Skb = n]
= E[Yikbt(2, Hkb(2))− Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t, Skb = n],
the average treatment effect of non-incentivized and incentivized grants, respectively,
on those who do not participate in outreach in a treatment sub-district—never takers
and incentive compliers;
δ1t + γ1t + γ2t = E[Yikbt(1, 1)− Yikbt(0, 0)|t, Skb ∈ {a, c}]
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= E[Yikbt(1, Hkb(1))− Yikbt(0, 0)|t, Skb ∈ {a, c}]
and
δ2t + γ1t + γ3t = E[Yikbt(2, 1)− Yikbt(0, 0)|t, Skb ∈ {a, c, v}]
= E[Yikbt(2, Hkb(2))− Yikbt(0, 0)|t, Skb{a, c, v}],
the average treatment effect of non-incentivized and incentivized grants, respectively,
on those who do participate in outreach in a treatment sub-district—always takers and
compliers.
In summary, based on treatment assignment and post-treatment household out-
reach choices, we are able to partition the population into subpopulations. Using a
differences-in-differences strategy, we identify the causal average treatment effect of
non-incentivized and incentivized block grants, by comparing average outcomes pre-
and post-treatment. We control for time trend by making the assumption that it is
homogeneous for all subpopulations (Assumption 2). We are able to estimate pre-
treatment (baseline) averages because the survey data for half the surveyed households
is longitudinal and thus post-treatment variables are observable to stratify these house-
holds. However, we are not able to perfectly identify the subpopulations; depending
on the treatment assignment we are able to identify different unions of subpopulations.
In particular, the subpopulations we are interested in—and as we see will see below,
those that have the strongest immunization response to treatment—are those who take
up health information outreach.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Subpopulations
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Table 3.2: Subpopulation Proportions
Wave 2 Wave 3 Panel Only
Always Takers (S = a) 0.218∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Any Compliers (S = c) 0.045∗∗ 0.029 0.034
(0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
Incentive Compliers (S = v) −0.016 −0.008 0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025)
Observations 10,550 10,567 15,781
R2 0.002 0.001 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.001 0.001
F Statistic 9.513∗∗∗ 4.318∗∗ 11.080∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported
between ()
2 3 (all)
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0.50
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Figure 3.1: Subpopulations Proportions Plot
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Using a linear regression of health information participation on treatment, we are able
to estimate the sizes of the four latent subpopulations. From the results in Table 3.2
there does appear to be a difference between compliers and always takers (significant
in wave 2 but not wave 3). However, the introduction of incentivized grants does not
appear to lead more households to participate in health information outreach, beyond
what non-incentivized grants do.
Possible explanation for not observing a significant size to the compliers subpopu-
lation in wave 3 is that either we do not have sufficient power to detect the diminished
subpopulation size, or that we are considering some households in wave 3 to not have
participated in outreach and did not count them as always takers or compliers, while
they had participated in the period around wave 2 (recall that only half the surveyed
households are repeated in all survey waves). Nevertheless, a regression using only
panel households also does not yield a significant size to the complier subpopulation.
The main conclusion we draw from this regression is that there does not appear
to be a difference in the subpopulations that participate in outreach activity in either
treatment arm (incentivized or not). This allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of
incentives versus no incentives since outreach participating subpopulations—the sets
{a, c} and {a, c, v}—are comparable. In the discussion that follows, of the results
of average treatment estimation, we will simply refer to two groups: never takers
(Skb = n), and outreach participators (Skb 6= n).
Since our analysis is focused on outreach participators, we carry out a regression
of the outreach decision on household and mothers’ characteristics. We report our
results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. We are not able to make clear conclusions about how
to identify the participator subpopulation, perhaps to better target an intervention.
It does appear that women who are more informed at baseline were more likely to
participate in outreach, suggesting that outreach might not have been a treatment
mediator: outreach participation mostly identified households who are more responsive
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to treatment. However, the purpose of our investigation is to refine the evaluation of
whether incentivized grants were effective, since an intention-to-treat might be under
powered, without proposing any changes to the intervention’s design.
Table 3.3: Household Characteristics
Outcome Variable: Household Outreach Participation
Intercept 0.288∗∗∗
(0.022)
Floor Construction: Tile −0.039∗∗
(0.019)
Floor Construction: Cement/Brick −0.011
(0.018)
Floor Construction: High Quality Wood 0.110∗
(0.059)
Floor Construction: Low Quality Wood −0.064∗∗
(0.029)
Floor Construction: Bamboo −0.033
(0.032)
Floor Construction: Earth −0.029
(0.022)
Floor Construction: Other −0.276
(0.443)
Drinking Water Source: Pumped Well −0.043∗
(0.024)
Drinking Water Source: Well −0.011
(0.022)
Drinking Water Source: Rain 0.165
(0.113)
Drinking Water Source: Lake 0.751∗
(0.444)
Drinking Water Source: Spring −0.016
(0.022)
Drinking Water Source: River −0.068
(0.046)
Drinking Water Source: Mineral −0.054
(0.066)
Drinking Water Source: Other −0.288
(0.444)
Religion: Catholicism 0.213∗∗∗
(0.022)
Religion: Protestantism 0.067∗∗∗
(0.024)
Religion: Buddhism −0.260
(0.256)
Religion: Hindu −0.007
(0.157)
Religion: Marappu 0.141∗∗
(0.061)
Religion: Other −0.266
(0.443)
Observations 5,135
R2 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.029
F Statistic 7.195∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
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Table 3.4: Mothers’ Characteristics
Outcome Variable: Household Outreach Participation
Intercept 0.272∗∗
(0.133)
Number of Pregnancies 0.212∗∗
(0.088)
Number of Prenatal Visits: Does Not Know −0.286∗
(0.152)
Start Breastfeeding: In One Day 0.008
(0.073)
Start Breastfeeding: After One Day −0.016
(0.101)
Start Breastfeeding: After One Week −0.096
(0.224)
Start Breastfeeding: Does Not Know −0.229
(0.377)
Feed Child With Diarrhea: More 0.159∗∗∗
(0.060)
Feed Child With Diarrhea: Less 0.035
(0.059)
Feed Child With Diarrhea: Stop −0.357∗
(0.191)
Feed Child With Diarrhea: Does Not Know −0.117
(0.266)
Liquids for Child With Diarrhea: More −0.029
(0.057)
Liquids for Child With Diarrhea: Less −0.024
(0.096)
Liquids for Child With Diarrhea: Stop 0.015
(0.317)
Liquids for Child With Diarrhea: Does Not Know −0.072
(0.077)
Mean Children Immunization (< 6 months old) −0.079
(0.109)
Observations 476
R2 0.062
Adjusted R2 0.060
F Statistic 1.795∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
3.4.2 Average Treatment Effects on Outreach Participators
In this section, we will discuss our regression results estimating average treatment ef-
fects (ATE) on two subpopulation grouping: never takers and outreach participators.
Table 3.5 shows the six estimates we will consider. For each of the subpopulation group-
ings, we will estimate the ATE of non-incentivized and incentivized grants separately,
as well as estimate the difference between them.
In estimating ATEs on immunization, we focused on children below the age of
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Figure 3.3: Mothers’ Characteristics
Table 3.5: Regression Estimated Effects
Subpopulation Estimated Average Treatment Effect
Never Takers
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n E[Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)|S = n]
Incentivized ATE |S = n E[Y (2, 0)− Y (0, 0)|S = n]
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n E[Y (2, 0)− Y (1, 0)|S = n]
Always Takers & Compliers
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n E[Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 0)|S 6= n]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n E[Y (2, 1)− Y (0, 0)|S 6= n]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n E[Y (2, 1)− Y (1, 1)|S 6= n]
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two years old, since older children might have already passed the age when they are
supposed to receive most of their immunizations, by the time the intervention started.
We consider three age groups: (i) two year old and younger, (ii) one year old and
younger, and (iii) six month old and younger children. Regression result are reported
in Tables 3.6-3.8.
The strongest effect we find is that of incentivized grants, for the three age groups.
It is a strikingly strong effect: for six month old and younger children in the final
survey, we find an estimated increase of 14.3% in the number of immunizations taken.
This is almost a doubling of immunization, relative to the baseline mean of 30.2%
immunizations taken, for the outreach participator subpopulation. In the lower range
of effect, we find an increase of 7% of immunizations (compared to the baseline mean
of 55.3%) for children younger than two years.
In the last survey wave, for children aged one year or younger and children aged six
month or younger, there is also a significant difference between the non-incentivized
ATE and incentivized ATE. This additional increase in immunization due to incentives
is more than half the entire incentivized ATE. While we cannot compare the effect of
block grants to no grants for outreach participators (a cross sectional comparison), since
we cannot identify how the {a, c} group fared in the control, the estimated additional
effect of incentives gives us a lower bound on the effect of incentives compared to the
control6.
For the never takers, we do not find any significant treatment effect. The estimated
effects are all positive, yet relatively smaller in magnitude than for the outreach partic-
ipators. There also appears to be a positive effect to incentives, but also insignificant.
Comparing our results with those by Olken et al. (2012), we see that our estimates
for the effect of incentivized grants on outreach participators is almost four times that
of the intention-to-treat estimates. The intention-to-treat ATE of incentivized grants
is estimated to be 1.8% while our estimates for the outreach participators are around
6This is the lower bound assuming E[Y (0, 1)− Y (0, 0)|S 6= n] ≤ E[Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 0)|S 6= n].
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10%. This is consistent with the outreach participators being around a quarter of the
population. Finally, Olken et al. (2012) find that incentivized grants have an additional
3.76% effect on the baseline immunization 10th percentile. From Table 3.4 we see that
while the effect of baseline immunization levels on outreach participation is insignifi-
cant, it is negative. This suggests that there might be a slight overlap between our
outreach participator subpopulations and their low baseline immunization subpopula-
tion, explaining how both analyses of effect heterogeneity would find strong impacts
for these similar subpopulations.
Figure 3.4 provides a qualitative view of how the distribution of immunization rates
changes over the survey waves, in the three experiment arms and the four identifiable
subpopulations. For instance, in the plot for six month old and younger children, we
can see how participators (always taker and compliers) increase immunizations and
how it is stronger for the incentivized treatment. We can also see how the never takers
do not change their immunization rates. Figure 3.5 plots the same distributions but
focusing on how their means and quartiles respond to treatment.
We also investigated how the Generasi project impacted other health indicators
for the outreach based subpopulations (reported in Tables 3.9-3.18). Our findings are
generally similar to Olken et al. (2012). For the number of prenatal checks, iron sup-
plement pills taken by pregnant mothers, and the percentage of malnourished children
our estimates are insignificant. For the delivery by midwife indicator, they do not
find any significant effect, while we find a significant increase of 6% in the probability
of using a midwife, for never takers receiving incentivized block grants. For outreach
participators, we also find significant increases of slightly higher magnitude in response
to both incentivized and non-incentivized grants. We do not find a significant differ-
ence between incentivized and non-incentivized treatments. The same regression with
the dependent variable indicating delivery by a trained professional had no significant
estimates. For postnatal care, we only find a significant effect for incentivized grants
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on never takers. For the number of vitamin A supplements taken, we find significant
increases by around 50%, with similar results for both grant types and both subpopu-
lation groups. For the number of times a child was weighted, we only find a significant
effect to incentivized grants on never takers, for one year or younger children. For six
month or younger children, we find a significant positive additional effect to incentives,
but are not able to precisely estimate treatment effects (only their difference).
Finally, since there is a concern that we might be observing significant effects only as
a result of significance level inflation (the probability of a Type I Error increases as we
test more hypotheses), we consider a simple and conservative correction, the Bonferroni
correction, where significance levels are corrected to be α˜ = α/C, where C = 8 is the
number of tests done (the number of health behavior indicators evaluated). In that case,
while the majority of estimated effects are no longer significant, the average treatment
effect of incentivized block grants on outreach participators remain significant at the 5
and 10 percent levels (Abdi 2007).
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Table 3.6: Immunization Rate (Aged Two Years or Younger) (Differences-in-
Differences)
Wave 3
Baseline Mean 0.553∗∗∗
(0.031)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.021
(0.029)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.046
(0.030)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.026
[F = 0.750, p = 0.386]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.024
[F = 0.496, p = 0.481]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.070**
[F = 4.261, p = 0.039]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n 0.046
[F = 1.453, p = 0.228]
Observations 4,753
R2 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.064
F Statistic 9.539∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level,
reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square
brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother char-
acteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.7: Immunization Rate (Aged One Year or Younger) (Differences-in-Differences)
Wave 2 Wave 3 All
Baseline Mean 0.482∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.038)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.016 0.031 0.024
(0.039) (0.035) (0.033)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.043 0.056 0.049
(0.039) (0.038) (0.036)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.027 0.025 0.025
[F = 0.587, p = 0.444] [F = 0.547, p = 0.460] [F = 0.662, p = 0.416]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.089** 0.039 0.063
[F = 4.457, p = 0.035] [F = 0.721, p = 0.396] [F = 2.529, p = 0.112]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.100** 0.123*** 0.111***
[F = 4.873, p = 0.027] [F = 8.202, p = 0.004] [F = 8.008, p = 0.005]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n 0.011 0.084* 0.048
[F = 0.058, p = 0.809] [F = 2.839, p = 0.092] [F = 1.360, p = 0.244]
Observations 2,546 2,592 4,222
R2 0.063 0.063 0.055
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.062 0.055
F Statistic 4.957∗∗∗ 5.015∗∗∗ 7.211∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
88
Table 3.8: Immunization Rate (Aged Six Months or Younger) (Differences-in-Differences)
Wave 2 Wave 3 All
Baseline Mean 0.295∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.045) (0.038)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.027 0.048 0.038
(0.042) (0.038) (0.036)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.019 0.039 0.031
(0.038) (0.038) (0.035)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
[F = 0.046, p = 0.831] [F = 0.052, p = 0.819] [F = 0.048, p = 0.827]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.003 0.057 0.033
[F = 0.004, p = 0.952] [F = 1.624, p = 0.203] [F = 0.659, p = 0.417]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.068 0.143*** 0.104***
[F = 1.823, p = 0.177] [F = 9.455, p = 0.002] [F = 6.813, p = 0.009]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n 0.065 0.085* 0.072*
[F = 1.361, p = 0.244] [F = 2.806, p = 0.094] [F = 2.742, p = 0.098]
Observations 1,313 1,330 2,163
R2 0.063 0.074 0.058
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.072 0.057
F Statistic 2.516∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Figure 3.4: Immunization Density Across Waves and Subpopulations
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Figure 3.5: Immunization Boxplots Across Waves and Subpopulations: the wave mean
is indicated by a red dot
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Table 3.9: Prenatal Checks (Differences-in-Differences)
Trimester 1 Trimester 2 Trimester 3
Baseline Mean 2.630∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗∗ 3.705∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.160) (0.214)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.076 −0.087 −0.017
(0.111) (0.124) (0.154)
Incentivized ATE |S = n −0.019 −0.016 0.060
(0.111) (0.120) (0.152)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n -0.095 0.071 0.076
[F = 0.653, p = 0.419] [F = 0.349, p = 0.555] [F = 0.189, p = 0.664]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.085 -0.205 -0.215
[F = 0.452, p = 0.501] [F = 1.872, p = 0.171] [F = 1.372, p = 0.242]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.110 -0.033 0.083
[F = 0.668, p = 0.414] [F = 0.049, p = 0.825] [F = 0.164, p = 0.686]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n -0.025 0.172 0.298
[F = 0.026, p = 0.871] [F = 1.013, p = 0.314] [F = 1.523, p = 0.217]
Observations 9,472 9,245 8,593
R2 0.032 0.035 0.057
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.035 0.057
F Statistic 9.185∗∗∗ 9.788∗∗∗ 15.140∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.10: Assisted in Delivery (Differences-in-Differences)
Delivery by Trained Professional Delivery by Midwife
Baseline Mean 0.775∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n −0.023 −0.022
(0.034) (0.036)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.045 0.038
(0.037) (0.038)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.068* 0.060*
[F = 3.500, p = 0.061] [F = 2.711, p = 0.100]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.057 0.077*
[F = 1.626, p = 0.202] [F = 2.810, p = 0.094]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.056 0.080*
[F = 1.800, p = 0.180] [F = 3.017, p = 0.082]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n -0.001 0.002
[F = 0.000, p = 0.987] [F = 0.002, p = 0.963]
Observations 7,688 7,688
R2 0.120 0.076
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.075
F Statistic 30.730∗∗∗ 18.430∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
Table 3.11: Iron Pills (Differences-in-Differences)
Given Iron Pills Iron Tablet Sachets
Baseline Mean 0.929∗∗∗ 2.071∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.130)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.006 0.150
(0.022) (0.116)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.030 0.092
(0.021) (0.110)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.024 -0.058
[F = 1.142, p = 0.285] [F = 0.288, p = 0.592]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.005 0.026
[F = 0.063, p = 0.802] [F = 0.031, p = 0.860]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.000 0.185
[F = 0.000, p = 0.998] [F = 2.249, p = 0.134]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n -0.005 0.159
[F = 0.054, p = 0.817] [F = 1.108, p = 0.293]
Observations 7,630 7,018
R2 0.076 0.022
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.022
F Statistic 18.400∗∗∗ 4.724∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.12: Postnatal Care Visits (Differences-in-Differences)
1-7 Days After 8-40 Days After All
Baseline Mean 2.922∗∗∗ 3.440∗∗∗ 6.362∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.477) (0.633)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.011 −0.436 −0.425
(0.216) (0.428) (0.550)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.387∗ 0.195 0.583
(0.218) (0.391) (0.523)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.376 0.631 1.007*
[F = 2.600, p = 0.107] [F = 1.867, p = 0.172] [F = 2.884, p = 0.089]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.319 0.283 0.602
[F = 1.942, p = 0.164] [F = 0.373, p = 0.542] [F = 1.002, p = 0.317]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.046 -0.008 0.038
[F = 0.033, p = 0.856] [F = 0.000, p = 0.986] [F = 0.004, p = 0.952]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n -0.273 -0.291 -0.565
[F = 0.979, p = 0.323] [F = 0.270, p = 0.604] [F = 0.604, p = 0.437]
Observations 7,688 7,688 7,688
R2 0.031 0.012 0.019
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.012 0.019
F Statistic 7.214∗∗∗ 2.844∗∗∗ 4.329∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.13: Vitamin A Supplements (Aged Two Years or Younger) (Differences-in-Differences)
Wave 3
Baseline Mean 1.253∗∗∗
(0.270)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.425∗
(0.225)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.322
(0.246)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n -0.103
[F = 0.252, p = 0.616]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.106
[F = 0.116, p = 0.734]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.198
[F = 0.483, p = 0.487]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n 0.305
[F = 0.812, p = 0.368]
Observations 905
R2 0.052
Adjusted R2 0.050
F Statistic 1.449∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level,
reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square
brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother char-
acteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.14: Vitamin A Supplements (Aged One Year or Younger) (Differences-in-Differences)
Wave 2 Wave 3 All
Baseline Mean 0.885∗∗ 1.195∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.365) (0.338)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.417 0.800∗∗ 0.649∗∗
(0.327) (0.343) (0.318)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.721∗∗ 0.666∗∗ 0.732∗∗
(0.351) (0.335) (0.324)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.304 -0.133 0.083
[F = 1.654, p = 0.199] [F = 0.387, p = 0.534] [F = 0.187, p = 0.666]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.573* 0.556* 0.578*
[F = 2.850, p = 0.092] [F = 2.745, p = 0.098] [F = 3.227, p = 0.073]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.549 0.711* 0.650*
[F = 2.158, p = 0.143] [F = 3.136, p = 0.077] [F = 3.515, p = 0.061]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n -0.024 0.155 0.072
[F = 0.009, p = 0.926] [F = 0.327, p = 0.567] [F = 0.114, p = 0.736]
Observations 444 510 837
R2 0.064 0.070 0.036
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.066 0.034
F Statistic 0.853 1.127 0.899
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.15: Number of Weightings (Aged Two Years or Younger) (Differences-in-Differences)
Wave 3
Baseline Mean 2.794∗∗∗
(0.071)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.027
(0.063)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.153∗∗
(0.078)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.126
[F = 2.594, p = 0.107]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.002
[F = 0.001, p = 0.977]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.098
[F = 1.922, p = 0.166]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n 0.100
[F = 1.639, p = 0.201]
Observations 4,026
R2 0.025
Adjusted R2 0.025
F Statistic 3.068∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level,
reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square
brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother char-
acteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.16: Number of Weightings (Aged One Year or Younger) (Differences-in-Differences)
Wave 2 Wave 3 All
Baseline Mean 2.858∗∗∗ 2.809∗∗∗ 2.745∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.109) (0.094)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n −0.142 −0.075 −0.104
(0.109) (0.094) (0.091)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.043 0.086 0.062
(0.114) (0.103) (0.099)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.185* 0.161 0.166*
[F = 2.956, p = 0.086] [F = 2.239, p = 0.135] [F = 2.838, p = 0.092]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.088 -0.008 -0.045
[F = 0.503, p = 0.478] [F = 0.005, p = 0.943] [F = 0.180, p = 0.671]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.108 0.138 0.122
[F = 0.630, p = 0.427] [F = 1.334, p = 0.248] [F = 1.079, p = 0.299]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n 0.196 0.146 0.167
[F = 1.847, p = 0.174] [F = 1.109, p = 0.292] [F = 1.687, p = 0.194]
Observations 1,986 2,108 3,437
R2 0.027 0.033 0.024
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.032 0.024
F Statistic 1.614∗∗ 2.049∗∗∗ 2.507∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.17: Number of Weightings (Aged Six Months or Younger) (Differences-in-Differences)
Wave 2 Wave 3 All
Baseline Mean 2.434∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 2.378∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.185) (0.159)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n −0.068 −0.086 −0.069
(0.200) (0.186) (0.174)
Incentivized ATE |S = n 0.096 0.081 0.094
(0.196) (0.187) (0.177)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n 0.164 0.167 0.162
[F = 0.651, p = 0.420] [F = 0.716, p = 0.398] [F = 0.783, p = 0.376]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.382* -0.012 -0.169
[F = 3.037, p = 0.082] [F = 0.004, p = 0.952] [F = 0.822, p = 0.365]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n 0.252 0.312 0.279
[F = 1.101, p = 0.294] [F = 2.071, p = 0.150] [F = 1.862, p = 0.173]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n 0.634** 0.324 0.447**
[F = 5.791, p = 0.016] [F = 1.876, p = 0.171] [F = 4.143, p = 0.042]
Observations 938 964 1,593
R2 0.042 0.050 0.032
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.049 0.031
F Statistic 1.169 1.492∗∗ 1.522∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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Table 3.18: Percentage of Malnourishment (Differences-in-Differnces)
Wave 2 Wave 3 All
Baseline Mean 0.046 0.098∗ 0.082
(0.059) (0.057) (0.055)
Non-incentivized ATE |S = n 0.016 0.018 0.018
(0.065) (0.067) (0.063)
Incentivized ATE |S = n −0.032 −0.028 −0.034
(0.065) (0.064) (0.063)
Incentive Additional Effect |S = n -0.048 -0.046 -0.052
[F = 0.840, p = 0.360] [F = 0.730, p = 0.393] [F = 1.087, p = 0.297]
Non-incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.021 -0.028 -0.015
[F = 0.064, p = 0.801] [F = 0.102, p = 0.749] [F = 0.036, p = 0.850]
Incentivized ATE |S 6= n -0.133 -0.114 -0.127
[F = 2.128, p = 0.145] [F = 1.613, p = 0.204] [F = 2.052, p = 0.152]
Incentive Additional Effect |S 6= n -0.112 -0.086 -0.111
[F = 1.352, p = 0.245] [F = 0.745, p = 0.388] [F = 1.360, p = 0.244]
Observations 3,609 4,109 7,281
R2 0.025 0.048 0.033
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.047 0.033
F Statistic 2.722∗∗∗ 5.991∗∗∗ 7.226∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the sub-district level, reported between ()
F statistics for hypotheses tests are reported between square brackets []
Refer to Table3.5 for meaning of estimated effects
Regression includes controls for household and mother characteristics (see AppendixC)
Regression includes subpopulation fixed effects
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3.5 Conclusion
Aiming to investigate the extent to which there is heterogeneity in households’ response
to the Generasi intervention, we adopt a population stratification strategy. We strat-
ify based on how households respond to one possible mechanism through which the
intervention operates, or at least identifies households that might be more amendable
in their health choices. The post-treatment behavior we adopt is households’ partic-
ipation in health information outreach activity, which became available to the entire
population at the same time the randomized Generasi intervention started. We do
not make causal claims about outreach participation since it is not manipulated in the
experiment; we only use it to identify latent types of households. The main result,
adding to the Olken et al. (2012) analysis, is that for the subpopulation of households
participating in outreach activities, we find a significant and strong effect for the in-
tervention on immunization rates. This effect is as strong as an increase of 14.3% in
the number of vaccines taken, and incentivized grants are estimated to have an effect
about 8% higher than non-incentivized grants. This result is robust to significance level
corrections done because of the multiple hypothesis nature of our inference.
Appendix A
Instrumental Variable Analysis
Tables A.1 and A.2 below show the F statistics for tests of joint significance of the
instrumental variables, in the first stage regressions corresponding to the regressions in
Tables 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. The first column specifies which endogenous regressor
is regressed on the set of instrumental variables.
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Table A.1: Instrumental Variable Joint Significance in First Stage Regression (Linear)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Betweennessji 143.67 516.32 72.65 77.18 273.06 2624.70 44.57 601.61 2911.10 2171.46 2638.74
Nonconformjit 99.55 69.29 1166.87 4788.64
V ariabilityjt 76.11 131.98 68.25 116.82 409.62 1160.77
(V ariabilityjt)
2 153.51 123.35 780.39
Extremityjt 154.83 179.02 279.89 235.55
Betweennessji ×Nonconformjit 454.55 198.61 502.13
Betweennessji × V ariabilityjt 172.65 454.80 902.34 1612.30
Betweennessji × (V ariabilityjt)2 180.12 1089.89
Betweennessji × Extremityjt 1512.01 2016.61 2977.70
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Table A.2: Instrumental Variable Joint Significance in First Stage Regression
(Quadratic)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Betweennessji 1140.98 2486.88 77.18 601.61 192.96 4304.66 8699.23
Nonconformjit 189.58 239.21 157842.68
(Nonconformjit)
2 92.40 174.30 36023.54
V ariabilityjt 131.98 116.82 20889.76
(V ariabilityjt)
2 153.51 123.35 7925.51
Extremityjt 102.34 98.02 296.30
(Extremityjt)
2 100.06 72.36 260.55
Betweennessji ×Nonconformjit 278.23 29923.74
Betweennessji × (Nonconformjit)2 109.60 534.78
Betweennessji × V ariabilityjt 454.80 5700.88
Betweennessji × (V ariabilityjt)2 180.12 2202.96
Betweennessji × Extremityjt 1043.28 15899.49
Betweennessji × (Extremityjt)2 501.36 8942.96
Appendix B
Intervention and Outreach Identification
• We can then identify the time trend, for all t > 1
λτ = E[Yikbt|t = τ, Zb = 0, Hkb = 0]− E[Yikbt|t = 1, Zb = 0, Hkb = 0]
= E[Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t = τ, Zb = 0, Hkb(0) = 0]
− E[Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t = 1, Zb = 0, Hkb(0) = 0]
= E[Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t = τ, Skb ∈ {c, v, n}]
− E[Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t = 1, Skb ∈ {c, v, n}],
• Using model (3.1) we can estimate, for all τ > 1
λτ + δ1τ = E[Yikbt|t = τ, Zb = 1, Hkb = 0]− E[Yikbt|t = 1, Zb = 1, Hkb = 0]
= E[Yikbt(1, Hkb(1))|t = τ, Zb = 1, Hkb(1) = 0]
− E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Zb = 1, Hkb(1) = 0]
= E[Yikbt(1, Hkb(1))|t = τ, Skb ∈ {v, n}]
− E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {v, n}]
λτ + δ2τ = E[Yikbt|t = τ, Zb = 2, Hkb = 0]− E[Yikbt|t = 1, Zb = 2, Hkb = 0]
= E[Yikbt(2, Hkb(2))|t = τ, Zb = 2, Hkb(2) = 0]
− E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Zb = 2, Hkb(2) = 0]
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= E[Yikbt(2, Hkb(2))|t = τ, Skb = n]
− E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t,= 1, Skb = n].
• We can estimate, for all τ > 1
λτ + γ1τ =E[Yikbt|t = τ, Zb = 0, Hkb = 1]
− E[Yikbt|t = 1, Zb = 0, Hkb = 1]
=E[Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t = τ, Zb = 1, Hkb(0) = 1]
− E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Zb = 1, Hkb(0) = 0]
=E[Yikbt(0, Hkb(0))|t = τ, Skb = a]
− E[Yikbt(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb = a].
• We can estimate, for all τ > 1
λτ + δ1τ + γ1τ + γ2τ =E[Yikbt|t = τ, Zb = 1, Hkb = 1]
− E[Yikb1|t = 1, Zb = 1, Hkb = 1]
=E[Yikbt(1, Hkb(1))|t = τ, Zb = 1, Hkb(1) = 1]
− E[Yikb1(0, 0)|t = 1, Zb = 1, Hkb(1) = 1]
=E[Yikbt(1, Hkb(1))|t = τ, Skb ∈ {a, c}]
− E[Yikb1(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {a, c}]
λτ + δ2τ + γ1τ + γ3τ =E[Yikbt|t = τ, Zb = 2, Hkb = 1]
− E[Yikb1|t = 1, Zb = 2, Hkb = 1]
=E[Yikbt(2, Hkb(2))|t = τ, Zb = 2, Hkb(2) = 1]
− E[Yikb1(0, 0)|t = 1, Zb = 2, Hkb(2) = 1]
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=E[Yikbt(2, Hkb(2))|t = τ, Skb ∈ {a, c, v}]
− E[Yikb1(0, 0)|t = 1, Skb ∈ {a, c, v}]
Appendix C
Household and Mother Controls
• hh.floor.construct
• mother.num.preg
• mother.know.prenatal.checks
• mother.know.breastfeed.after.deliver
• mother.know.food.baby.diarrhea
• mother.know.liquids.baby.diarrhea
• mother.decide.kids.health.self
• mother.permit.buy.medicine
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